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Abstract
Critical infrastructure protection (CIP) refers to safeguarding essential services from harm. CIP has
gained recognition as a priority area on the national security agendas of many countries in recent years,
most notably Australia, due to events that have compromised the critical infrastructure (CI) of other
nations. The importance of the CIP process is evidenced extensively in the related literature, where the
major phases of the process are discussed. Traditionally, the CIP focus is on the three major stages of
vulnerability identification, risk assessment and risk management. A study conducted by Breeding in 2003
introduced the risk of ‘sensitive but unclassified’ data to America’s infrastructure, viewing the threat on
CIP from an alternative viewpoint. ‘Sensitive but unclassified’ data refers to information that may not on
its own appear harmful but when amalgamated with additional data elements can be truly revealing about
CI, thus posing a threat to CIP. This study adapts Breeding’s research to an Australian setting, in an
attempt to determine the threat of public data availability on the CIP process in Australia. The
methodology involved an observational study on the nature of the public data availability situation
through a structured public data collection process, an evaluation of data protection mechanisms using a
content analysis, and a survey of security experts in Australia. The ultimate objective of the study was to
attempt to provide a solution to the censorship versus open information access debate, which is
presently a prominent dilemma. That is, should certain CI-related information be restricted from the public
arena in the interest of national security? The outcomes of the public data collection phase, the content
and the survey revealed that a balance between open data access and restriction is required, supporting
the existing view in the reviewed literature. A Stakeholder Matrix was devised as a crucial component of
public data protection, providing a sensitivity-based grading system. Additionally, a structured approach in
the form of the Public Data Protection Lifecycle was proposed, which recognised that current security
mechanisms (primarily written documentation) do not offer adequate protection for CI-related public
data. A comprehensive, and multi-faceted approach is required, which considers the Stakeholder Matrix,
current written documentation (licence agreements), and technical security mechanisms as instrumental
to protecting public data from potential misuse, and ensuring that the threat of public data availability on
the CIP process, and Australia’s CI is minimised.

Publication Details
This thesis was originally submitted as Abbas, R, The Threat of Public Data Availability on Critical
Infrastructure Protection (CIP), and the Level of Awareness Amongst Security Experts in Australila,
Bachelor of Information and Communication Technology (Honours), University of Wollongong, 2006,129p.

This thesis is available at Research Online: https://ro.uow.edu.au/thesesinfo/2

The Threat of Public Data Availability on
Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP),
and the Level of Awareness Amongst
Security Experts in Australia

Author
Roba Abbas
Academic Supervisor
Dr Katina Michael

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment for the requirements of the award of
Bachelor of Information and Communication Technology (Hons)
University of Wollongong 2006

The Threat of Public Data Availability on Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP), and the Level of
Awareness Amongst Security Experts in Australia

Abstract
Critical infrastructure protection (CIP) refers to safeguarding essential services from harm.
CIP has gained recognition as a priority area on the national security agendas of many
countries in recent years, most notably Australia, due to events that have compromised the
critical infrastructure (CI) of other nations. The importance of the CIP process is evidenced
extensively in the related literature, where the major phases of the process are discussed.
Traditionally, the CIP focus is on the three major stages of vulnerability identification, risk
assessment and risk management. A study conducted by Breeding in 2003 introduced the risk
of ‘sensitive but unclassified’ data to America’s infrastructure, viewing the threat on CIP
from an alternative viewpoint. ‘Sensitive but unclassified’ data refers to information that may
not on its own appear harmful but when amalgamated with additional data elements can be
truly revealing about CI, thus posing a threat to CIP. This study adapts Breeding’s research to
an Australian setting, in an attempt to determine the threat of public data availability on the
CIP process in Australia.
The methodology involved an observational study on the nature of the public data availability
situation through a structured public data collection process, an evaluation of data protection
mechanisms using a content analysis, and a survey of security experts in Australia. The
ultimate objective of the study was to attempt to provide a solution to the censorship versus
open information access debate, which is presently a prominent dilemma. That is, should
certain CI-related information be restricted from the public arena in the interest of national
security?
The outcomes of the public data collection phase, the content and the survey revealed that a
balance between open data access and restriction is required, supporting the existing view in
the reviewed literature. A Stakeholder Matrix was devised as a crucial component of public
data protection, providing a sensitivity-based grading system. Additionally, a structured
approach in the form of the Public Data Protection Lifecycle was proposed, which recognised
that current security mechanisms (primarily written documentation) do not offer adequate
protection for CI-related public data. A comprehensive, and multi-faceted approach is
required, which considers the Stakeholder Matrix, current written documentation (licence
agreements), and technical security mechanisms as instrumental to protecting public data
from potential misuse, and ensuring that the threat of public data availability on the CIP
process, and Australia’s CI is minimised.
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Chapter One
Research Proposal

1.1 Introduction
This study examines the threat of freely available information on critical
infrastructure protection (CIP) efforts, measuring the amount of information available for
public use, the existing security techniques to government information use, and the extent to
which security experts in Australia are conscious of resultant consequences.
Critical infrastructures (CI) are the essential services that contribute to the stability
and security of a country (Chakrabarty and Mendonca, 2004; Rinaldi et. al., 2001). A
comprehensive listing of critical infrastructure includes energy, banking/finance, water
related, transportation, agriculture, health and emergency, information and communications,
storage and transportation, government, law and order, and cultural services (Breeding, 2003;
Chakrabarty and Mendonca, 2004; Scholand et. al. 2005). A standard, global definition of
critical infrastructure is not available; rather, each respective country determines the critical
categories independently.
Critical infrastructure protection refers to safeguarding the identified services from
potential harm, including physical and/or electronic attacks (ASIO, 2006). Although minor
variations exist regarding the specific phases of the CIP process, it is widely agreed that the
typical steps encompass vulnerability assessment/scanning, risk assessment, and risk
management (Luiijf and Klaver, 2004; Jones et. al., 2003), as shown in Figure 1.1. The CIP
process is a crucial consideration today, particularly due to the prevalence of national security
issues as a result of recent global events, including 9/11 and the Bali bombings.

Vulnerability
Assessment

Risk
Assessment

Risk
Management

Figure 1.1 The Basic Critical Infrastructure Protection Process
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1.2 Background
CIP has been a global concern since the Cold War. However, the issue has gained
increased exposure in Australia since the incidents of Y2K, September 11, 2001 and Bali,
2002 (Luiijf and Klaver, 2004; Emergency Management Australia, 2003).
Additionally, the importance and increased use of the Internet and Information and
Communication Technologies (such as biometrics, database processing, geospatial
information exploitation, video processing and visualisations) have amplified the risks on
critical infrastructures (Popp et. al., 2004). These technologies provide outlets for
data/information exchange, and have simplified the ability to transmit data. Of particular
importance to this research is the exchange of ‘sensitive but unclassified’ public data. This
refers to information that may be unclassified when used independently, but when combined
enables inferences or previously unconsidered patterns to emerge, which may prove harmful
(Thuraisingham, n.d.).
An introductory study into the consequences of public data availability on critical
infrastructure states that there is an increase in the education levels of the individuals/groups
attempting to penetrate critical services (Breeding, 2003). In particular, their use of
technologies, and the availability of certain tools, has become progressively sophisticated,
allowing room for the collection, use and duplication of information. These concepts are
supported by authors such as Weinmann (2006), who asserts that the Internet offers a vast
repository of data that may potentially be exploited, and be used to compromise the CIP
process, and consequently undermine national security.
The amalgamation of the abovementioned factors has resulted in, or prompted the
need for national security to become a major global concern.

1.3 Relevance of Research
There are four primary sources of justification for this current study, including:
1. The recognised need for CIP, and national security research;
2. The lack of consideration for public data availability in Australia, with respect to the
CIP process;
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3. The escalating (and somewhat neglected) public data availability situation that
currently exists; and
4. The interest expressed in the study by a number of Australian agencies.
The need for critical infrastructure protection, and national security is recognised and
supported by Government and research bodies throughout Australia (and internationally). For
example, the Australian Research Council (ARC) lists critical infrastructure protection as one
of the major ‘Priority Areas for ARC Funding 2005-2006’ (ARC, 2006). Additionally, the
Research Network for a Secure Australia identifies threat detection and counter terrorism
(which are components or subsets of the CIP process) as essential research areas (RNSA,
2006).
The Australian Government has also established a number of networks devoted
entirely to CIP initiatives, most notably the Trusted Information Sharing Network (TISN),
overseen by the Attorney General’s Department. The primary objective of TISN is to provide:
“… a forum in which the owners and operators of critical
infrastructure work together by sharing information on security
issues which affect critical infrastructure” (TISN, 2006).
TISN stresses the importance of a coordinated approach to CIP involving the Government,
industry and members of the general public, providing a set of guidelines or principles that
participants should adhere to.
However, despite these Government and research initiatives, inadequate attention is
paid the notion public data availability in Australia as a fundamental consideration in the CIP
process. The relevance of this study is that it addresses public data availability from a threat
perspective; that is, data availability is traditionally viewed as a positive aspect that can assist
in CIP efforts, whereas the negative implications are often ignored. The focus of CIP efforts,
to date, have been on the establishment of risk assessment and management strategies, thus
reinforcing the need for the perceiving CIP from an alternative, but equally significant
viewpoint.
Public data availability, in terms of the CIP process, has not been addressed
adequately in Australia. This research applies the US ‘sensitive but unclassified data’ study
conducted by Breeding (2003) to an Australian setting. Breeding’s study found that there is
the need for restricting access to public data, by striking a balance between data provision and
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protection or restriction. The applicability of Breeding’s findings to the Australian
environment will be assessed.
The current research is unique and valuable in that it attempts to address the
escalating public data availability situation, a present concern throughout Australia, which
requires urgent attention. This is evidenced by a recent occurrence, whereby an individual
was accused of terrorism-related preparations as a result of obtaining public data concerning
the Australian electricity grid and a number of defence sites. These preparations involved:
“…acquiring two maps of the grid under a false company name and
downloading 38 aerial photographs of the defence sites” (Wallace,
2006).
The example indicates the significance of this research, and the importance of considering
critical infrastructure protection, public data availability and community awareness in a
collective manner.
Additionally, the significance of this research is evidenced by the increased attention
received from a number of Australian agencies, such as the Department of Defence, the
Department of Transport and Regional Services, and the Australian Institute of Criminology.
Additionally, a number of research networks concerned with CIP studies have expressed
interest in this investigation. The outcomes, and recommendations will be distributed to the
appropriate agencies.
The sources of justification, and relevance of this thesis are depicted in Figure 1.2.

1.4 Aims and Objectives
The aim of this report is to determine the potential threat of data or information being
publicly available in Australia, and how aware security experts are of the issue of data
accessibility to ensure CIP. A vital consideration is whether they are able to assist devising a
solution to the censorship versus open access debate that can be implemented in a practical
setting. The specific objectives of the study include:
1. To identify the data supplying agencies across Australia;
2. To collect public data from the identified agencies;
3. To gather and record details on the security mechanisms encountered in the data
collection process;
4. To perform a content analysis on written security-related documents;
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5. To display the possible methods of data manipulation; and
6. To assess the level of awareness, and opinions of security experts.
Current CIP Situation
The Impact of Recent Events

Vulnerability
Assessment

Risk
Assessment

Risk
Management

Relevance of the Thesis
CI-Related Public Data
CI-Related Public Data

Australian Focus
Interest from Australian Agencies
The Impact of Recent Events

Vulnerability
Assessment

Risk
Assessment

Risk
Management

CI-Related Public Data
CI-Related Public Data

Figure 1.2 The Sources of Justification and Relevance of the Study

1.5 Methodology and Justification
This comparative study will utilise a multi-method approach to data collection and
analysis, incorporating largely qualitative research methods. Qualitative data generally refers
to non-numerical records that are typically varied in structure and style (Richards, 2005). The
qualitative methods utilised in this research are an observational study, a document analysis
and a survey.
The data collection and analysis methods to be used are depicted in Figure 1.3,
including their associated relationship (a detailed description of the methods is provided in
chapter 3). A notable aspect of the table is the perspective studied, which defines public data
availability from the viewpoint of the identified individual.
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Case Study: Australia

Data Collection

Data Analysis

Perspective(s)
Studied

Observation
Internet-based collection

Data agency profiles

Analyst
Researcher
Terrorist

Document analysis

Content analysis
Scenarios

Data supplier/
Industry

Survey

Qualitative analysis
Matrix development

Security expert

Figure 1.3 The Data Collection and Analysis Relationship
The identified research techniques are examined below.

1.5.1 Observation/Internet-Based Collection
An observation involves monitoring the state or behaviour of a particular entity,
usually measured over a period of time (Richards, 2005). This study will observe or measure
the nature of the public data availability situation over time, utilising an Internet-centred
public data collection process.
This phase requires an observation of the public data availability situation at a
specific point in time, where data will be collected relating to critical infrastructure items,
with a specific focus on Australia. The process of collecting public data using Internet-related
sources is immense, and has been scoped for the purpose of this research, as indicated by the
predefined collection process, discussed in chapter 3, section 3.4.1. The intention of this
assessment is to determine the amount of information that can be collected about Australia’s
CI.
The steps to accomplish this task include:
1. Identifying the data supplying agency sectors in Australia;
2. Establishing a list of data supplying agencies, using Government directories and
related searches;
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3. Developing a profile of each agency;
4. Collecting free public data from the agencies concerning critical infrastructure items;
and
5. Creating a repository of CI-related public data organised by data supplying agency
sector.
This methodology phase will be used as the basis of the remaining stages.

1.5.2 Document Analysis
A document analysis involves the use of archival records or written materials (both
public or private) to gather data, providing that the collection of such records is carried out in
an unobtrusive manner (Lofland et. al., 2006)
In terms of this study, the document analysis will involve collecting a number of
written security-related resources from the identified data supplying agencies. This process
involves identifying the techniques, and documents use to govern and set out the manner in
which public data can be used. The written documents may include privacy policies, terms
and conditions statements, license agreements and disclaimers. The objective of this stage is
to determine whether the existing security techniques are adequate in terms of limiting and
preventing public data from potential misuse.
The steps involved in this phase include:
1. Collecting and recording details about security-related mechanisms and documents
encountered during the data collection process;
2. Analysing the documents, using the Leximancer software tool that will examine all
documents in terms of the main themes; and
3. Developing scenarios and demonstrating techniques that can be employed to
manipulate the collected data, discussing whether the security techniques in place can
prevent such activities.
The data, and information gained from the first two stages will be used to construct the
critical infrastructure protection survey of security experts.
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1.5.3 Survey
Surveys provide a structured means of collecting data through verbal or written
questioning, involving open-ended and/or fixed questions (Sarantakos, 2005). This research
will make use of both open-ended and closed questioning techniques to measure the
awareness level of security experts in Australia, on issues relating to public data availability
and CIP. The survey responses will be expressed qualitatively.
The purpose of this process is to determine the awareness level of security experts,
who are defined members of the Research Network for a Secure Australia (RNSA), an
association heavily involved in CIP-related research and collaboration. Therefore a security
expert, in this instance, may refer to Government officials, members of tertiary institutions,
infrastructure owners and operators, consultants, and other scholars.
The steps in conducting this survey include:
1. Using the findings of the observational study and document analysis to draft survey
questions;
2. Conducting a pilot survey to determine the validity of the questions, the types of
responses to expect, and the necessary modifications to the survey;
3. Distributing the survey to the intended community members at an annual national
security conference held by the RSNA, and online to any RNSA member on the
‘critical infrastructure’ mailing list; and

4. Analysing the results qualitatively, and utilising the responses to devise a solution to
issues such as data restriction versus open access.

1.5.4 Methodology Elements
The relationship between the methodology components, and the research objectives is
illustrated in Figure 1.4.

-16-

The Threat of Public Data Availability on Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP), and the Level of
Awareness Amongst Security Experts in Australia

3. To gather & record
details on the security
mechanisms encountered
in the data collection
process
4. To perform a content
analysis on written
security-related
documents
5. To display the possible
methods of data
manipulation

6. To assess the level of
awareness, and opinions of
security experts

Observation
Internet-based
collection

Document analysis

Survey

Data agency
profiles

Content analysis
Scenarios

Qualitative analysis
Matrix development

Objective

1. To identify the data
supplying agencies across
Australia
2. To collect public data
from the identified
agencies

Stage 3

Data
collection

Stage 2

Data
analysis

Stage 1

Figure 1.4 Methodology Components

1.6 Limitations
The scope of this study has been restricted to 2 major factors:
1. Geographic region; and

2. Public data types.

1.6.1 Geographic Region
The focus of this research is on applying a study conducted by Breeding (2003) in the
United States to an Australian context. The research will concentrate collectively on CI in
Australia, demonstrating the types of information, and the ease with which data can be
collected. The data collection process is not exhaustive but is intended to be indicative of the
CI data elements available for access, and reproduction in Australia. The primary objective
for limiting the study by geographic region, and more specifically Australia, is due to the need
to measure the public data availability situation in the country, an investigation that has not
previously been attempted.
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1.6.2 Public Data Types
Public data has been confined to ‘sensitive but unclassified’ data, including the free
and commercial variety. However, throughout the data collection phase, the study will further
be limited to encompass only free data, obtainable from sources such as the Internet, public
libraries, books and council resources. This is due to the nature of this thesis (and the thesis
question), which is concerned chiefly with the free information available in the public arena,
and the related threat on the CIP process (Figure 1.5).

Data

Public

Free

Private

Commercial

Internet
Libraries
Councils
Community Centres

Information Desks

Figure 1.5 Types of Data
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Chapter Two
Literature Review

2.1 Introduction
This study examines the threat of freely available information on critical
infrastructure protection (CIP) efforts, measuring the types of public data available, the public
data supplying agencies, and the extent to which security experts are aware of the associated
implications of public data availability. It is therefore essential to examine the literature
surrounding public data availability and critical infrastructure protection, to correctly establish
the context of the thesis question. The areas to be independently assessed include critical
infrastructures (a definition of the term, and why critical infrastructures are important),
critical infrastructure protection (the steps in the protection process, and the impact of recent
events that have contributed to the research), and public data availability (the nature of public
data, and the impact of information and communication technologies, and national security
vs. open information access issues).
A comprehensive understanding of these concepts will enable the gap in the research
to be articulated, and allow for greater appreciation of the importance of the study.

2.1.1 Conceptual Framework
The conceptual framework in Figure 2.1 illustrates the various literature views
(clusters) that contribute to the correct understanding of the thesis question. This research can
be seen as combining the three fields of study, potentially resulting in contributions to all
areas.
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Figure 2.1 Conceptual Framework

2.2 Critical Infrastructure
Critical, by definition, refers to an entity that is essential or vital in nature (Bezerra et
al., 2005). Critical infrastructures (CI), more specifically, are the essential services that
contribute to the stability and security of a country (Chakrabarty and Mendonca, 2004;
Rinaldi et al., 2001).
From a historical perspective, critical services have been in existence since the
development and growth of cities, which led to the need for water supplies (Mendonca et al.,
2004). In the Australian context, critical infrastructure encompasses banking and finance,
transport and distribution, energy, utilities, health, the food supply and communications
(Attorney General’s Department, 2006; TISN, 2006). More modern infrastructure types are
the telecommunications services, including Internet and wireless technologies. For the
purpose of this study, the term critical infrastructure represents the listed services. An
important consideration is that a standard, global infrastructure definition and list is not
available; rather, each respective country identifies the critical categories independently.
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In terms of the Australian situation, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation
(ASIO) defines critical services as
“Those physical facilities, supply chains, information technologies
and communications networks which, if destroyed, degraded or
rendered unavailable for an extended period, would significantly
impact on the social or economic well-being of the nation, or affect
Australia’s ability to conduct national defence and ensure national
security” (ASIO, 2006).

This definition is reflected in key Australian agencies that focus on critical
infrastructures, and related protection campaigns such as the Attorney General’s
Department and the Trusted Information Sharing Network.

2.2.1 Physical and Cyber Infrastructure
While critical infrastructure was traditionally described as the necessary physical
services within a given community, the definition has been extended by a number of
academics to encompass cyber infrastructures (Kun, 2002; Neumann, 2002; Overill, 2001).
This is primarily due to the prominence of information and communication technologies
(ICTs) in recent years, and the consequent increased reliance on computer networks.
De Bruijne (2004), and Chakrabarti and Manimaran (2002) state that the progression
of information and communication technologies has created a situation where physical critical
infrastructures heavily depend on the support and operation of cyber infrastructures.
Similarly, Overill (2001) states that physical and cyber infrastructures are interdependent
entities; in particular the prosperity of physical services such as power, water, electrical and
emergency services is reliant on digital systems or cyber infrastructure. These concepts are
reinforced by Feglar and Levy (2004), who feel that computer communications underlie the
global economy, and are required to ensure that physical infrastructures are properly
functioning, as they are interrelated and interconnected.
That is, the previously identified physical infrastructures require cyber services for
survival and effective operations. This literature has raised awareness of the various aspects
of critical services, and has resulted in the need for including both physical and cyber
infrastructures in the scope of this study.
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2.2.2 Infrastructure Interdependencies
In addition to the relationship between physical and cyber infrastructures, it is vital to
consider the interdependencies existing between the individual points of interest. These
relationships are of particular importance to the thesis, as critical infrastructures today do not
exist in isolation; rather there are physical or logical connections between them. Mendonca et
al. (2004) describe critical infrastructures as “systems of systems”; that is, they must be
regarded as interdependent services. While a number of studies (such as that by Rinaldi et al.,
2001) model or map such interdependencies, Mendonca et al.’s investigation assesses the
impact of such interdependencies in a real world situation (that is, the impact of
interdependencies on the events of 9/11). The research revealed that disruptions were
dispersed across all eight infrastructures (as recognised by the US President’s Commission of
Critical Infrastructure Protection).
Schainker et al. (2006) agree with this claim; that critical infrastructures should be
viewed as inextricably linked entities. This is evidenced in the authors’ study of the electricity
infrastructure, which revealed that a threat affecting one area would undoubtedly impact on
the dependent critical services. This is particularly relevant to aid in grasping the complex
environment in which these services exist, and the difficulties in maintaining reliable
operations, and protecting against potential vulnerabilities.
To further complicate the situation, a study by Rinaldi et al. (2001) introduces another
dimension to the issue of interdependencies, which must also be reviewed. That is, the authors
examine a number of external factors, which also exert their influence. They include (but are
not limited to) technical, health and safety, economic and legal/regulatory forces.
As is evident by this body of literature, critical infrastructure relationships are
complex, and difficult to define and manage. Therefore, a study on critical services must
consider such interdependencies, as they ultimately impact on the critical infrastructure
protection process.

2.3 Critical Infrastructure Protection
Critical infrastructure protection (CIP) refers to safeguarding the identified services
from potential harm, including physical and/or electronic attacks (ASIO, 2006; Schainker et
al, 2006). Amin (2005) and Mendonca et al. (2004) identify the sources of infrastructure
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vulnerabilities as natural disasters, system complexities, equipment failures, human errors and
deliberate sabotage/attacks. Similarly, Kun (2002) recognises these sources in view of
national security, economic stability and public safety concerns, highlighting the importance
of the infrastructure protection process.
The value of the CIP process is also evidenced in a number of recently established
initiatives supported by government and research bodies within Australia, but also
internationally. For instance, the Australian Research Council (ARC) lists critical
infrastructure protection as one of the major ‘Priority Areas for ARC Funding 2005-2006’
(ARC, 2006). Additionally, issues of threat detection and counter terrorism (which are subsets
of the CIP process) are identified as essential by the Research Network for a Secure Australia
(RNSA, 2006). This is also reflected in the policies of many nations, such as the US, which
recognises critical infrastructure protection as one of its six mission areas (Yen, 2004).
Thus, the protection of points of interest is a crucial issue for all countries, and chiefly
aids in maintaining national security, an issue that has gained importance particularly as a
result of a number of recent events.

2.3.1 Recent Events
CIP has been a global concern since the Cold War; however, the issue has gained
increased exposure in Australia since the Y2K concerns of the late nineties, the incidents of
September 11, 2001 and Bali, 2002 (Rothery, 2005; Luiijf and Klaver, 2004; Emergency
Management Australia, 2003; De Bruijne, 2004). Such recent events, specifically 9/11, have
raised public awareness of the vulnerabilities and risks existing in their surroundings, and the
need for eliminating or mitigating these threats (Neumann, 2002).
The CIP literature to date has a common element in that a majority of the studies cite
these occurrences (that is, events of the past forty years) as creating a heightened need for
protecting infrastructure networks (Amin, 2005; Amin 2002). Therefore, a situation presently
exists where nations are developing the strategies and stages of the CIP process, in order to
avert situations such as those identified.
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2.3.2 The CIP Process
As with the definition of critical infrastructure, the CIP process itself varies between
nations. This process, whether referring to physical or cyber infrastructure, is constrained by a
number of factors, such as social, political and economic aspects, in addition to a country’s
specific environment (Bezerra et al., 2005).
The first stage in the CIP process involves assessing the context in which the
infrastructure exists (including consideration of the previously mentioned factors). A paper by
Bezerra et al. (2005) suggests that a country’s unique context affects the CIP strategies
implemented, using Brazil’s telecommunications infrastructure as an example. The authors
propose a model for safeguarding this infrastructure, applicable not only to Brazil, but to any
infrastructure type (in any country). The stage of determining the context is followed by
measuring the threats to the identified critical services, the establishment of security controls,
the creation of an ideal scenario and finally a comparison with the actual situation (providing
necessary recommendations).
Similar to Bezerra et al.’s research, a study by Luiijf and Klaver (2004) deals with the
various phases in the CIP process, presenting the initial steps required in protecting The
Netherlands’ critical infrastructures. The focus of the paper is on the ‘Quick-scan’ phase,
which identifies the critical assets that require protection. An essential outcome of this Dutch
study is the need for a multi-tiered approach to CIP (that is, providing protection at the
strategic, tactical and operational levels). Other authors (Jones et al., 2003) identify risk
assessment (identifying the risks, sources, interdependencies and developing threat scenarios)
and risk management (cost evaluation, and conducting a trade-off analysis when selecting a
response option) as core phases of the CIP process, which follow the identification of the
critical infrastructure.
In terms of the Australian situation, there is presently a Risk Management standard
that may be used for safeguarding critical infrastructure, which was developed in 1999, and
later revised in 2004 (Standards Australia, 2004). The distinct phases of this process include:
•

Communicate and consult;

•

Establish the context;

•

Identify risks;

•

Analyse risks;

•

Evaluate risks;
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•

Treat risks;

•

Monitor and Review; and

•

Record the process.

Whilst the mentioned CIP efforts are typically focussed on the protection of physical
infrastructures, the importance of safeguarding cyber critical services is gaining recognition.
Threats to cyber infrastructures can be just as damaging, and reach a greater population,
because an attack may be perpetrated from across the globe, and on multiple sites (Elbert,
2003). Feglar and Levy (2004) propose an independent process for protecting cyber critical
infrastructures which includes scope definition, asset identification and valuation, threat and
vulnerability assessment, risk analysis and risk management.
Throughout the cyber protection process, Shainker et al. (2006) state that an
important element in maintaining cyber security is to understand that the infrastructure (as a
whole) is only as secure as its ‘weakest link’. This also holds true for physical infrastructures,
due to the interdependencies discussed in section 2.2.2. Additionally, the elements of the
cyber protection process can be aligned with the physical CIP phases, as a general pattern in
the models emerges.
For instance, Australia’s national guidelines for protecting both physical and cyber
infrastructures involves risk assessments, public information and media management,
prevention and preparedness, and response and recovery (Attorney General’s Department,
2006).
At this point, it is essential to reconcile the various definitions of CIP. According to
Rothery (2005) of Emergency Management Australia
“Critical infrastructure protection has become a general label for a
range of activities undertaken jointly by government and the operators
of key locations, facilities and systems to ensure they are adequately
managing risk”.
Therefore, based on the literature, it is possible to classify the range of activities in the CIP
process into three broad categories. Although minor variations exist between the CIP phases
internationally, the typical steps in the CIP process can be regarded as:
•

Vulnerability assessment/scanning;

•

Risk assessment; and

•

Risk management (Luiijf and Klaver, 2004; Jones et al., 2003).
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The rationale behind this categorisation is further illustrated in Figure 2.2, and the
basic process for protecting physical and cyber infrastructure is presented.
The studies in the literature concerning CIP are particularly pertinent to this thesis, as
they all describe the phases that must be considered, with a particular focus on the
preliminary stages of the CIP process (specifically in the case of Bezerra et al., 2005 and
Luiijf and Klaver, 2004). In this literature, a clear gap exists in terms of the importance of
public data availability as a fundamental force exerting pressure on the CIP process. Data
availability, and open information access is generally perceived as a positive aspect of CIP
from the viewpoint that it is essential in emergency management, and infrastructure protection
activities. However, the potentially devastating effects of allowing open access to CI-related
datasets have not been considered at the Australian setting. This is required in this era where
e-Government is gaining popularity, and departments and agencies increasingly moving their
data ‘online’, and providing a high level of transparency. This thesis aims to modify the CIP
process through the inclusion of public data availability as a recognised, and major threat to
the process, a move, which is supported by recent events that have relied on the availability of
public data.

-26-

The Threat of Public Data Availability on Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP), and the Level of
Awareness Amongst Security Experts in Australia

Physical CIP

Cyber CIP

Physical and
Cyber CIP

Standards
Australia
(2004)

Bezerra et al.
(2005)

Luiijf and Klaver
(2004)

Jones et al. (2003)

Feglar and
Levy (2004)

Attorney General’s
Department
(2006)

-Communicate
and consult
-Establish
context

-Assess context

-Quick scan

-Information
collection

-Scope
definition
-Asset
identification
and valuation
-Threat and
vulnerability
assessment

Public information
and media
management

-Identify,
analyse and
evaluate risks

-Measure threats

-Interdependency
assessment
-Criticality
assessment

-Risk assessment
(risk, sources,
interdependencies,
threat scenarios)

-Risk analysis

-Risk assessment

-Treat risks
-Monitor and
review
-Record the
process

-Establish security
controls
-Scenario creation
-Comparison with
actual situation

-Prevention and
preparedness
-Incident response
Recovery

-Risk management
(cost evaluation
and trade-off
analysis)

-Risk
management

-Prevention and
preparedness
Response and
recovery

Vulnerability
Assessment

Risk
Assessment

Risk
Management

Figure 2.2 The Basic CIP Process for Physical and Cyber Infrastructure

2.4 Public Data Availability
Public data in this study is concerned with ‘sensitive but unclassified’ data that may
be obtained through open or freely available outlets. This refers specifically to information
that may be unclassified when used independently, but when combined enables inferences or
previously unconsidered patterns to emerge, which may prove harmful to the CIP process
(Thuraisingham, n.d.).
Givens (n.d.) states that public records (or data) may be provided in two ways, either
freely or commercially. Even though the latter requires a fee for access, it remains available in
the public arena and can potentially be obtained by any individual, which makes it
exceedingly relevant to this study.
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In recent years, there has been a shift in focus from personal to geospatial data. For
example, authors such as Givens (n.d.) focus on personal data, that is, information concerned
with an individual, such as health and legal records. However, authors including Hariharan et
al. (2005) concentrate on location specific data with regards to critical services. The authors
describe the need to integrate geospatial data from disparate sources in order to improve the
means in which data (particularly the commercially available variety) is accessed in
infrastructure protection campaigns, such as emergency management and infrastructure
protection. The intention is to provide seamless access to data required to improve protection
procedures.
Since the events of 9/11, a direct link has been drawn between data collection
facilitated by information and communication technologies (ICTs) and the act of terrorism
(Davies, 2002), or threats to CIP endeavours. The various aspects of ICTs in relation to
critical infrastructure protection are examined.

2.4.1 The Role of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs)
The importance and increased use of the Internet, and Information and
Communication Technologies (such as biometrics, database processing, geospatial
information exploitation, video processing and visualisations) have amplified the risks on
critical infrastructures (Popp et. al., 2004). These technologies provide outlets for
data/information exchange, and have simplified the ability to transmit data.
ICTs are providing tremendous opportunities for development. Kun (2002) describes
the traditional technology focus, which has been on increasing the capabilities, productivity,
and increasing the speed of technology whilst concentrating on digitising data, information
and knowledge. The author feels that technology users have also become more proficient in
utilising the available technology tools, and consequently accessing information. This
proficiency in technology use also applies to terrorist groups, and individuals with a malicious
intent.
An introductory study into the consequences of public data availability on critical
services (in the US) states that there is an increase in the education levels of the
individuals/groups attempting to penetrate critical services (Breeding, 2003). Breeding’s
method involves assessing various online sources to determine the threat posed by ‘sensitive
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but unclassified’ data availability to US physical security. This thesis can be seen as an
extension of this study, applied to an Australian setting (with an additional focus determining
the awareness levels and opinions of security experts). Breeding’s study found that terrorists’
use of technologies, and the availability of certain tools, has become progressively
sophisticated, allowing room for the collection, use and duplication of ‘sensitive but
unclassified’ information, to be used for negative purposes. In a book titled Terror on the
Internet: The New Arena, The New Challenges, Weinmann (2006) describes terrorist use of
the Internet for information warfare (or cyber terrorism) purposes, and data collection.
Information warfare is closely related to the issue of cyber terrorism, a term that was
first used in the 1970s, but became popular in 1996. According to Overill (2001), the phrase is
generally defined as the premeditated attack on information activities and infrastructures,
whilst preventing an attack on one’s own information resources. That is, information warfare
involves employing both an offensive and defensive strategy simultaneously. This issue is
particularly relevant due to the over-reliance on computer or cyber infrastructures, most
notably the Internet. While authors such as Elbert (2003) feel that cyber terrorism is a recent,
genuine concern for the protection of critical services, Weinmann suggests otherwise.
This author’s studies found that it is highly unlikely that terrorists will use ICTs to
launch cyber attacks; however, the Internet remains a repository for the collection of
information/data about transportation, infrastructures and maps, for example (Cherry, 2005).
It is believed that terrorists are increasingly using ICTs to further their cause, and carry out
their preparations (Davies, 2002). Furthermore, the “intelligence information gained by cyber
terrorist activities can be used to support the more traditional forms of terrorism” (Elbert,
2003). These claims support the underlying concept of the thesis, identifying the potential
threat of public data availability.
Relevant to this concept of data collection is the chief idea that information and
communication technologies can both aid, and hinder national security efforts, with particular
reference to terrorist threats (Kun, 2002). Authors such as Yen (2004), Popp et al. (2004),
Stout (2004), and Amin (2005) provide some insight into these issues.
Yen (2004) examines how ICTs can be utilised positively to advance the homeland or
national security cause. Popp (2004) also shares the view that if used to their full potential,
ICTs can ultimately
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“Create a seamless environment where analysts and decision- and
policy makers can come together to collaborate, translate, find, link,
evaluate, share, analyse, and act on the right information faster than
ever before to prevent terrorist attacks…”

Whilst the authors state that ICTs can be used to enable improved, faster information
sharing capabilities, between multiple agencies, allowing for enhanced analysis,
decision-making and problem solving, they do not address the negative implications.
That is, that these technologies are also at the heart of the national security problem,
and may be utilised negatively. More balanced accounts are offered by Stout, and
Amin.
Stout (2004) describes the present age as a “hybrid era”, in that it promises great
potential for technological advancement within an uncertain context (referring primarily to
terrorist activities). Technology was previously viewed in terms of its ability to provide
safeguards, however, the theme of Stout’s paper is that technology alone cannot prevent acts
of terrorism, and data misuse. This is based on the premise that information and
communication technologies are revolutionising the area of communications, thus enabling
improved information sharing, specifically through the use of the Internet. This signifies that
the efficient and correct use, and understanding of these technologies will determine the
success of both malicious activities, and national security operations (Stout, 2004).
Amin (2005) supports Stout’s claims, classing the protection of critical infrastructures
largely as a technological problem or issue. The author feels that technology can serve two
purposes; the first is to aid in penetrating or threatening a particular infrastructure, the second
to provide protection mechanisms to safeguard the same services.
The conflicting roles of ICTs have been widely discussed in the literature; resulting in
the requirement to review a number of issues such as national security (including CIP) in
terms of censorship, open information access, and the related privacy concerns.

2.4.2 National Security, Open Information Access and Privacy
It has been asserted that recent events (such as 9/11) could have been prevented if
access to particular datasets in the public arena was limited

(Kumagai, 2003). This

accordingly raises the need for controlling access to ‘sensitive but unclassified’ data, in order
to maintain national security. These concerns introduce the concept of censorship, or
restricting access to information that may be used in an adverse manner. Davies (2002) notes
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that censorship, in another era, may have failed to be implemented or considered, as it attacks
the basic principles underlying the right to privacy, free speech and open source information.
However, it is now a current issue, which must be resolved or addressed, but is difficult to
achieve, and somewhat impossible.
Peace (2003) explores the issue of censorship in higher learning institutions, such as
universities, measuring the importance of this area to heads of computer services departments.
Survey findings (of 133 computer departments in the United States) suggest that the issue of
censorship is not a priority at present, and will unlikely be one in the near future. Universities
are in conflict in terms of restricting undesirable information, whilst allowing legitimate
Internet sources to be accessed. This struggle exists perhaps due to the nature of ICTs, and
particularly the Internet.
In a study of the censorship concerns of the Singaporean government, Ang and
Nadarajan (1996) state that the Internet “defies censorship” because of its inherent structure,
and characteristics, most notability its capacity to allow public access to information, and the
creation and distribution of data. The authors explore a number of solutions to this dilemma,
including the use of technology to provide restrictions to information access on the Internet,
in addition to stringent monitoring of Internet activity. However, they feel these solutions are
inadequate, with the steadfast view that the Singapore government “cannot do much to censor
the Internet”. These issues continue to be a topic of debate, with many views or solutions
being offered by academics.
For instance, Shearer (1998) provides an alternative view to censorship, highlighting
the need for establishing a ‘Code of Ethics’ to govern communications over the Internet. This
is based on a number of factors including widely available “public good” information, and
methods of authentication/verification to access other forms of data. Shearer stresses the need
for the “responsible global citizen” to overcome the negative aspects of Internet technology,
requiring global community members to individually accept responsibility for their actions,
and maintain basic human rights, environmental awareness, and global advancement.
However, it must be noted that this paper was written in 1998, prior to a majority of the
events discussed in section 2.3.1, after which the concept ‘public good’ has been generally
disregarded in the literature. Instead, various governments, such as the Australian, have
enacted technology-related (or censorship) legislation, such as the laws to intercept digital
communications such as email.
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While the discussion has focussed on censoring ICTs, a contradictory element exists
in the literature, whereby there is the call for increased ‘intelligence’ or information access to
assist with maintaining an appropriate level of national security. In recent years, government
agencies have expressed the need for information or data collection in the interest of national
security.
Kumagai (2003) stresses the need for information access, with a focus on the FBI
(Federal Bureau of Investigation), and its role in intelligence gathering and counter terrorism.
The FBI is seeking to reform in a number of areas of intelligence gathering, such as increased
data warehousing and data mining; that is, collecting data on individuals from various data
sources and identifying patterns. In collecting such data, Kun (2002) raises concerns over data
misuse, and its impact on civil liberties. This raises the issue of balancing privacy concerns
with national security issues.
Privacy literature and concerns have been in existence for centuries, however, such
concerns have now been exacerbated, and personal privacy has been applied to the
technology arena (Walters, 2001). A prominent academic in the privacy literature is Herman
Tavani. In a paper written in 1999, Tavani discusses the privacy concerns introduced by
Internet technologies, and how identifying such concerns is a complex process due to
problems in defining the term ‘privacy’ (Tavani, 1999). Walters (2001) also concurs with this
theory, offering many definitions of privacy, including the legal and social views, providing
the underlying literature and differing views, but still struggling for a standard definition.
Tavani (1999) and Walters (2001) also provide an alternative view, of technology
being used to promote privacy; that is, through the use of privacy enhancing technologies
(PETs). The situation is such that technology forms part of both the problem and solution.
Givens (n.d.) discusses the delicate act of balancing access to public data and
maintaining personal privacy, with particular reference to legal records (such as court files
and case indexes). Governments are increasingly providing information online. Givens (n.d.)
feels that the notion of e-government (and data provision) is primarily to allow the public to
monitor the activities of the government. However, a number of negative consequences will
inevitably arise due to public record access, most notably that the records will be used for
secondary purposes (such as to make inferences, and to perform data mining activities).
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As this body of literature has suggested, balancing national security, open information
access, and privacy concerns is difficult. Therefore, when identifying the threat of public data
availability, it is important to note that providing mechanisms to counteract such threats is a
difficult task, beyond the scope of this research. Nonetheless, the study of this literature
enables an accurate representation of the aspects affecting public data availability.

2.5 New Contribution to Knowledge
This literature review has provided an evaluation of the forces or factors that
contribute to the thesis topic The threat of public data availability on critical infrastructure
protection (CIP), and the level of awareness amongst security experts in Australia. By
examining the three literature clusters (critical infrastructure, CIP and public data availability
literature) it is possible to understand the complex environment in which the question is set.
The literature portrays the situation to be one where complex relationships and
dynamics exist, which consequently affects the critical infrastructure protection process.
Additionally, it is clear that while there is adequate emphasis on the risk (or vulnerability)
identification, risk assessment, and risk management phases of the CIP process, little attention
is paid to the publicly available data that exists, and surrounds the process in terms of the
potentially negative implications.
The outcomes of this research aim to contribute to the critical infrastructure, CIP and
public data availability literature by providing a representation on the views of security
experts in Australia with regards to public data availability. As the literature review has
illustrated, the balance between open information access and censorship has been studied, but
little has been achieved in Australia in terms of restricting certain CI-related data that may be
‘sensitive but unclassified’ in nature. Public data availability with respect to CIP is an area for
concern, as is evidenced by a number of recent events, the effects of which could have been
limited (or potentially prevented) had access to certain information been restricted from the
public arena. Breeding (2003) has provided an introduction into this field of study, and this
thesis aims to extend a number of the author’s findings (as described in section 2.4.1). More
importantly, the validity of Breeding’s outcomes in an Australian setting will be assessed.
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2.6 Conclusion
This chapter has presented the three literature streams that impact on the research
question, including the related components. A collective review of the fields has encouraged
the need to address the issue of how CI-related public data in Australia may be collected,
reproduced and used, in addition to the consequent effects on the CIP process. At this stage,
an important goal is to provide a methodology, and study that may be replicated or mirrored
in other Australian communities and potentially in international settings that addresses the
research aims and objectives. This will aid in enhancing or solidifying the CIP process by
identifying the threat of public data availability, and suggesting a relevant solution or method
that will allow the censorship versus access balance to be realised. This methodology is
described in chapter 3.
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Chapter Three
Methodology

3.1 Introduction
The type of research questions asked determine the selection of a suitable research
methodology (Veal, 2005; Jarvinen, n.d.). The literature review presented in chapter 2
identified the gap in the research, and verified the significance of the research question. The
review found that little attention is given negative implications of public data availability on
the critical infrastructure protection (CIP) process, identifying a need for considering the
potential threat in greater detail with a specific focus on the Australian situation. This chapter
defines the research purpose (given the current state of knowledge and the research
objectives), and identifies the research methodology to be applied to answer the thesis
question.

3.2 Research Purpose and Approach
The research purpose is to determine the threat of public data availability on critical
infrastructure protection, and the level of awareness amongst security experts in Australia by
satisfying the associated objectives. The objectives of this study are:
1. To identify the data supplying agencies across Australia;
2. To collect public data from the identified agencies;
3. To gather and record details on the security mechanisms encountered in the data
collection process;
4. To perform a content analysis on written security-related documents;
5. To display the possible methods of data manipulation; and
6. To assess the level of awareness, and opinions of security experts.
The thesis question is unique in that it draws on three distinct fields of study as
presented in section 2.1.1, amalgamating critical infrastructure, critical infrastructure
protection, and public data availability literature. An assessment of the literature concerning
this study has found that various research methods could be used but that the most pertinent is
case study research describing a particular unit of analysis, such as a geographic region. This
is evident in the topical research of Bezerra et al. (2005), Luiijf and Klaver (2004), Jones et al.
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(2003), Ang and Nadarajan (1996), and most notably Breeding (2003). The current research
applies Breeding’s US physical security study of the threat of ‘sensitive but unclassified’ data
to an Australian context. The case study research method is appropriate to this thesis, having
been shown as suitable in Breeding’s study.

3.3 Research Strategy and Type of Investigation
Yin (1994, p. 13) defines a case study as an empirical inquiry that:
“Investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life
context, especially when…the boundaries between the phenomenon
and context are not clearly evident.”
This study is empirical in that it focuses on collecting and analysing data concerning the
awareness levels of the security expert community, a phenomenon within its real-life context.
This includes a clarification study of the threat of public data availability on the critical
infrastructure protection process, describing both the threats and the associated awareness
levels and opinions of the experts. Case study research often requires the use of “multiple
sources of evidence” to answer the research question (Yin, 1994, p. 37), thus this study will
use a variety of qualitative research methods to achieve one research strategy.

3.3.1 Selecting an Appropriate Research Strategy
Yin (1994, p. 4) believes that three conditions influence the selection of an
appropriate research strategy. They include understanding:
1. The type of research question posed;
2. The extent of control over behavioural events; and
3. The degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to historical
events.
In terms of Yin’s first criterion, the thesis question can be broken down into two components,
and the following sub-questions can be asked:
1. What is the threat of public data availability on critical infrastructure protection
(CIP)?
2. What is the level of awareness amongst security experts Australia?
According to Veal (2005), the questions assist in identifying the data required, the data
sources, the appropriate method of analysis, and whether the strategies are qualitative or
quantitative (Figure 3.1).
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Please see print copy for Figure 3.1

Figure 3.1 Research Strategy Considerations, Adapted from Veal (2005)
Qualitative data refers to non-numerical records that are typically varied in structure
and style (Richards, 2005). The qualitative methods chosen for this study are an observational
study/internet-based data collection, document analysis, and survey.
Underlying this form of research is a general assumption about what is valid, often
referred to as ‘philosophical perspective’, which defines whether the study is interpretive,
critical or positivist (Myers, 1997). This research takes an interpretive stance, by describing
data supplying agencies and security experts in terms of their complex environment and
unpredictable behaviours. A primary objective is to understand the situation (that is, the
amounts of public data available and the level of awareness) with regards to the threat of
public data availability on CIP.
The appropriate strategies for this study are identified as survey and document
analysis. The latter, however, is not (on its own) sufficient in establishing the threat of public
data availability on CIP, as it represents only the perspective of data supplying agencies as
opposed to a complete representation of the situation. The strategy is supplemented with an
observational study, which according to Veal (2005, p. 110) can enhance a research project:
“While it is rarely possible to base a research project wholly on
observation, the technique has a vital role to play, either formally or
informally, in most research strategies…it is capable of presenting a

-37-

The Threat of Public Data Availability on Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP), and the Level of
Awareness Amongst Security Experts in Australia

perspective on a situation that may not be consciously apparent to the
individuals involved.”

This study is distinctive in that it observes the public data availability situation, as
opposed to individuals, collecting public data about Australia’s CI from the most
prominent data supplying bodies (see section 3.4).

3.3.2 Research and Methodology Elements
The chosen research design to address the research question can ultimately be
described as: an empirical, interpretive multi-method, case study approach utilising
qualitative research techniques. The relationship between the various methodology
components is illustrated in Figure 3.2, as is the applicability of the chosen methods to the
research question, and objectives.
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Format of
Outcomes

Expected
Outcomes

Data
analysis

Data
collection

Objective

Case Study: Australia

1. To identify the data
supplying agencies across
Australia
2. To collect public data from
the identified agencies

Observation
Internet-based
collection

3. To gather & record details
on the security mechanisms
encountered in the data
collection process
4. To perform a content
analysis on written securityrelated documents
5. To display the possible
methods of data manipulation

6. To assess the level of
awareness, and opinions of
security experts

Document analysis

Survey

Data agency profiles

Content analysis
Scenarios

Qualitative analysis
Matrix development

List of data suppliers
Profile of each agency
Repository of publicly
collected data
concerning Australia’s
CI

Collection of securityrelated documents
Prominent themes in
written security
documentation
Data manipulation
technique and
scenarios

Security expert
awareness levels and
opinions on the threat
of public data
availability on CI

Qualitative

Qualitative

Qualitative

Chapter 4

Chapter 5

Chapter 6

What is the threat of public data availability on
critical infrastructure protection?

Figure 3.2 Research Methodology Components
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3.4 Observation of the Public Data Availability Situation
An observation involves monitoring the state or behaviour of a particular site, usually
measured over a period of time (Richards, 2005). This study will, however, observe or
measure the nature of the public data availability situation in Australia over time, using an
Internet-centred public data collection process. The scope of the observation has been limited
for the purpose of this research, by considering only data supplying agencies, and data
concerning Australia’s CI.

3.4.1 Data Collection
This stage requires the identification of data supplying agencies in Australia, which is
a substantial exercise given that a data supplier can be an individual, institution or body that
directly or indirectly supplies data relating to critical infrastructure. Thus this task requires
scope. The limits of the observation/Internet-based collection are:
•

The Australian Government portal (Australia.gov.au) will be used as an initial
point of identification for Government (Federal and State Departments) data
suppliers;

•

The profile of each department will be used to identify whether the department
may possess CI-related data;

•

The most prominent commercial data suppliers and other supplying bodies
encountered while identifying Government departments will be further profiled;
and

•

The profile of each department is not exhaustive; that is, not all CI-related data
elements will be reproduced and entered into the data repository. The profiles
will contain the department’s name, the CI-related data element gathered, the
appropriate website link, and the location of the data file on the accompanying CI
(which will form an example of a CI data repository, organised by data supplier
sector.

The process of collecting CI data will further be scoped, due to the unstructured
nature of the Internet. Gathering data on the critical infrastructure will be restricted to the
accumulation of freely (as opposed to commercially) available resources, due to the time and
financial limitations imposed on this study. Commercial data suppliers will be profiled in
terms of the products they offer. To remove data collection bias, the process of collecting the
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information will be structured, and standardised for all data supplying agencies, in terms of
the:
•

Initial point of collection (that is Australia.gov.au);

•

Number of levels/pages on the website studied;

•

Means of recording the CI data;

•

The naming convention used on the CD; and

•

Timeframe for data collection.

This will result in a method that can be replicated (to produce aligned outcomes). The
intention of this observation is to identify the data supplying agencies in Australia, and to
determine the amount of information that can be collected (within the specified limitations
and collection process) about the critical infrastructure.

3.4.2 Data Analysis
Data collected in the observation will form the basis of the data supplier profiles,
which will examine the threat of public data availability on critical infrastructure protection
through the creation of a data repository. The data collected will take multiple formats, and be
stored in its original form on the accompanying CD. In terms of presentation, the data
supplier profiles will be provided in tabular form in the body of chapter 4. This approach is
considered the most appropriate and effective for displaying the outcomes of the data
collection phase, and indicates the forms of data available, their related web address, in
addition to the file name and location.
This methodology stage will satisfy a number of research objectives: to identify the
data supplying agencies across Australia, and to collect public data from the identified
agencies.

3.5 Document Analysis of Written Security-Related Documentation
A document analysis involves the use of archival records or written materials (both
public or private) to gather data, providing that the collection of such records is carried out in
an unobtrusive manner (Lofland et al., 2006).
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3.5.1 Data Collection
In terms of this study, the document analysis will involve recording information about
the security mechanisms encountered throughout the data collection phase for protecting
public data from misuse, and governing the data access/collection process. It will include
obtaining a number of written resources such as privacy policies, terms and conditions
statement, licence agreements, and disclaimers. The purpose of examining these sources is to
provide an insight into the public data supplying industry, and determine whether any
safeguards are currently in place to protect public data from potential exploitation.

3.5.2 Data Analysis
Content analysis is the chosen method of data analysis, and involves categorising the
information collected from the data suppliers in terms of the main themes that were
addressed. This task will be achieved through the use of the Leximancer software tool, an
application that:
“Can be used to analyse the content of collections of textual documents
and to visually display the extracted information. The information is
displayed by means of a conceptual map that provides a birds eye view
of the material, representing the main concepts contained within the
text and how they are related” (Leximancer Manual, 2005, p. 4).
In addition to extracting the key themes and concepts in the written security-related
documentation, it is important to demonstrate whether the security measures in place prevent
data manipulation from taking place. The data manipulation techniques will be discussed
through the creation of scenarios.
The data and information gained from this stage will fulfil three objectives of the
study: to gather & record details on the security mechanisms encountered in the data
collection process, to perform a content analysis on written security-related documents, and
to display the possible methods of data manipulation

3.6 Survey of Security Experts
Surveys provide a structured means of collecting data through verbal or written
inquiry, involving open-ended and/or fixed questions (Sarantakos, 2005).
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3.6.1 Data Collection
The purpose of using a survey in this study is to determine the level of awareness
amongst security experts in Australia, regarding the threat of public data availability on CIP.
A security expert refers to any member of the Research Network for a Secure Australia
(RNSA), a network focused on CIP research. Consequently, a security expert may include
Government officials, members of tertiary institutions, infrastructure owners and operators,
consultants and other scholars. The survey will follow a descriptive design, that is, it will
“produce information on groups and phenomena that already exist” (Fink, 1995). Survey
questions will be fixed, and open-ended based on the outcomes of the previous two
methodology stages.
The survey will be composed of the following sections:
i. Introduction, informing the participant of the research aim;
ii. Background, collecting information such as industry type and public data used;
iii. Licence agreements, asking for responses relating to the effectiveness and ideal
contents of the agreements;
iv. Stakeholder matrix, asking the participant to determine which data elements should be
available to various stakeholders; and
v. Security measures, requesting that the participant stipulate the technical and nontechnical mechanisms that may assist in protecting public data from misuse.
This survey is offered in Appendix A, and will be distributed at an annual national security
conference and also online. Furthermore, a pilot survey will be conducted to determine the
validity of these questions, the types of responses to expect, and the necessary modifications
to the survey design.

3.6.2 Data Analysis
The data collected from the survey will qualitative in nature; a majority of the
responses will be expressed in terms of the main themes highlighted, and how they can assist
in better understanding and devising a solution to the censorship versus open access debate.
The survey will be used as the basis of developing a stakeholder matrix that will provide a
sensitivity-based grading system of public data based on stakeholders. Other important
concepts, and trends found in the awareness levels and opinions of the security experts will be
discussed primarily in textual form, but also with supporting diagrammatic representations.
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The results will provide a representation of the awareness levels of security experts
regarding the threats described by the previous methodology components, thereby satisfying
the final objective of the study: to assess the level of awareness, and opinions of security
experts.

3.7 Unit of Analysis and Time Horizon
According to Yin (1994), the unit of analysis affects the research design and data
collection method, and must therefore be carefully selected. Yin also states that the research
question must lead to one favourable unit of analysis. The current thesis question does not
point to a specific unit of analysis.
In terms of the time horizon, this research is cross-sectional in nature. It involves the
collection of data during a particular timeframe (that is, a snapshot of the awareness levels of
security experts is taken). The various methods in the data collection phase, and the
associated analysis of each method will be completed over a five-month period. The expected
outcomes include a content analysis, profiles, scenarios and qualitative results (of survey
respondents’ viewpoints), which ultimately address the research question.

3.8 Conclusion
This chapter has proposed an exploratory, multi-method, case study approach to
addressing the thesis question, identifying the need for a document analysis, an observation
and a survey for data collection purposes. The analysis of the data will result in qualitative
data being produced, in order to satisfy the research objectives, and address the gap in the
current literature. Additionally, the development of the research strategy has allowed for the
structure of the remaining chapters to be determined. Chapter 4 will detail the observational
study while identifying and profiling the data supplying agencies, chapter 5 will record the
findings of the document analysis and chapter 6 will examine the survey and responses.
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Chapter Four
Public Data Suppliers in Australia

4.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to identify the public data suppliers in Australia. A
public data supplier in this instance refers to any individual, institution or body that supports
or facilitates the open distribution and use of information concerning Australia’s critical
infrastructure. The data may be deliberately or indirectly provided. Of particular importance
to this chapter are the identification of relevant data sources, and the classification of the
types of information that exist in the public domain. This chapter is to be used in conjunction
with the accompanying CD, as it is crucial to make reference to the collected files in order to
appreciate the nature of public data availability in Australia. Relevant links are also provided
to allow for additional research to be conducted.
Data can be categorised in many ways. This chapter is focused specifically on free
and commercial public data, which can be accessed physically and/or online, and includes
multiple formats such as images, text, video, maps, geographic coordinates and statistics. The
data presented in this chapter reveal certain aspects about Australia’s critical infrastructure (as
identified in the previous chapters), and have been accessed through data suppliers in
Government and commercial enterprises.
The presentation of this chapter is unique in that the raw CI-related data gathered is
represented in tabular form, demonstrating the outcomes of the data collection phase. The
primarily motive behind this presentation approach is that it enables the data elements
collected from each agency to be identified, the relevant links to be acknowledged, and the
file to be viewed on the accompanying ‘CI Data Repository’ CD. The tables do not have
headings, as they should be regarded as a primary outcome of this chapter. The data collected
was reformatted into table form to assist in focussing on the content and specific data
elements collected. Each table is composed of two distinct sections; the header provides the
name of the data supplier, whilst the table rows each present a description of the data element
accessed, a link to its original setting, and the location of the reproduced file on the CD.

-45-

The Threat of Public Data Availability on Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP), and the Level of
Awareness Amongst Security Experts in Australia

To gain the maximum effect from this chapter, it is suggested that the description of
data elements be initially read, and that the file be observed on the CD in its raw form. If
further information is required, the web addresses allow for the original context of the data to
be accessed. The tables collectively offer a textual representation of the ‘CI Data Repository’
CD, attempting to show the thought process engaged in throughout the collection of the
public data, a process that can be replicated by any individual, most notably those who wish
to engage in activities such as competitive analysis, fraud and on a grander scale, terrorism.
Of great significance is the ease with which the ‘CD Data Repository’ CD could be developed
using publicly available sources, and the ability to amalgamate data from disparate sources.

4.2 Data Supplier Categories
An assessment of the CI-related public data landscape in Australia enables the
identification of a number of distinct data supplier categories. The classes primarily include
the individual/physical data collection, Government bodies, commercial suppliers, utility
companies and telecommunications providers (see Figure 4.1).
An interesting observation is that a majority of the supplying bodies enable free
access to information, in an attempt to increase knowledge and educate their intended
audience. This can be referred to as an optimistic view of data provisioning; that is, the data is
provided merely as a tool to assist individuals in better accomplishing certain tasks. The
potentially undesirable consequences are therefore disregarded to an extent.
The subsequent sections provide an introduction to each data supplier category,
including the related sub-categories or agencies. Each identified agency has been examined,
and significant public data has been collected to demonstrate the ease with which such data
can be accessed. At the completion of this data collection phase, it is vital that the suppliers be
considered collectively in order to gain a comprehensive view of the main components in the
national public data environment.
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Australian Data Supplier
Categories

The individual/physical

Government

Federal

Commercial

Utility companies

Telecommunications
providers

State & Local
Key
Free
Purchased
Free/
Purchased

Figure 4.1 Australian Data Supplier Categories

4.3 The Individual/Physical
This category represents first-hand data collection, where an individual independently
collects critical infrastructure data from their surroundings. It is perhaps the simplest method
of data gathering and access, as in most cases it does not require the assistance of a third party
that may influence or prohibit the collection process. Certain data may require the use of
entities such as libraries, Councils and information desks; however, others such as the
capturing of video, photographs, GPS points and audio are independent activities. Publicly
available critical infrastructure data that may physically be collected includes:
•

Tourist guides/brochures;

•

Hardcopy statistics, books and magazines;

•

Maps;

•

Photographs;

•

Video and audio recordings; and

•

Geographic coordinates using a Global Positioning System (GPS) tool.

First-hand data collection may be considered one data simple method of data
gathering, given that in most instances there are very little mechanisms in place to screen the
individual gathering the data. Additionally, once the data has been collected, there are
minimal (and almost non-existent) enforcement techniques that govern the manner in which
the data may be used.
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This source of public data collection was included in the scope of the study to ensure
the completeness of the thesis. However, in terms of the public data availability debate, it is
difficult to practically introduce stringent security mechanisms to prevent such data from
being accessed. To do so would completely compromise the basic principles of a trusting and
informative society and community. As a result, the focus is on electronic public data access,
which is facilitated by the supplying agencies discussed in the remainder of this chapter.

4.4 Government
Government departments in Australia are prominent suppliers of public data due
chiefly to their focus on providing an open and accessible data network through an electronicGovernment (or e-Government) portal.
The e-Government movement of recent years has resulted in the trend to provide
effortless access to information, in addition to the need to process information in an electronic
environment (Wunnava and Madhusudan, 2000). e-Government “refers to the use of ICTs to
promote more efficient and effective government services, allow greater public access to
information and make government more accountable to citizens” (Punia and Saxena, 2004, p.
500). Many Western countries such as Britain, Canada, the United States, and most notably
Australia have been actively involved in e-Government initiatives since the mid-1990s (Lee
et. al., 2005).
Traditionally, the aim of e-Government was to allow the public to monitor the
activities of its government. However, authors such as Givens (n.d.) feel that e-Government is
now centred on public records access, resulting in a number of negative implications. That is,
the available records may be used for secondary purposes, such as to make inferences and
perform data mining activities, which can reveal undesired patterns about entities, which in
this instance are Australia’s critical infrastructure. However, positive implications do exist
and signify a more informed and knowledgeable public, and a certain level of trust between
Government and citizens, which is a desired and productive outcome. However, as Givens
(n.d.) states, the negative consequences must also be addressed.
The Australian Government is becoming progressively sophisticated in its provision
of e-Government services, with government departments at all levels moving towards
interactive services delivery (Davey, 2005). Additionally, the number of citizens making use
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of the electronic portal is increasing, which is greatly attributed to the advanced and
information-rich web pages.
Given this concept of e-Government, it is crucial to examine the Australian
Government portal (Australia.gov.au), and its link with other CI-related Australian
Government departments. Australia.gov.au provides a gateway that connects the government
with Australian citizens:
“It links to information and services on over 700 Australian
Government websites as well as selected state and territory
resources. Australia.gov.au also searches over five million
government web pages” (Australian Government, 2006).
Australia.gov.au is used as an initial point of analysis; that is, it was used to locate
independent government agency websites, and to profile each department with respect to the
available information. The examination is provided at both the Federal and State Government
levels to determine the types of public data concerning CI that can be accessed. The tools in
place to administer such access were recorded throughout this data collection phase, and will
be examined in the subsequent chapter. It is imperative to note that this assessment is not
entirely exhaustive; but was merely conducted to measure whether public data availability in
Australia is indeed an issue that must be reflected on in greater detail.

4.4.1 An Assessment of Federal Government Departments
The aim of this activity was to collect CI-related public data from Federal
Government departments, using an Internet-enabled computer, and word processing and
spreadsheet software as the primary tools for collection. A comprehensive list of Federal
Government departments was accessed on Australia.gov.au, each department name linking to
the dedicated website of the relevant agency, including the department’s function and role.
The profile of each department was briefly examined, to identify whether CI-related public
data may exist on the website, after which the site was briefly searched for publicly available
CI-related information. The Federal Government agencies considered in greater detail are
identified in Figure 4.2.
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Federal Government Data
Suppliers
Attorney-General’s Department (AG’s)
www.ag.gov.au

Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF)
www.daff.gov.au

Communications, Information Technology
and the Arts (DCITA)
www.dcita.gov.au

Defence
www.defence.gov.au
Finance and Administration
www.finance.gov.au

Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT)
www.dfat.gov.au

Environment and Heritage (DEH)
www.deh.gov.au

Transport and Regional Services (DOTARS)
www.dotars.gov.au

Industry, Tourism and Resources (DITR)
www.industry.gov.au

Figure 4.2 Federal Government Data Supplying Agencies
Each department is profiled below in terms of the public data that was made
available, using the defined tabular approach.

Attorney-General’s Department (AG’s)
A national security section mentioning the role of the department in coordinating
security efforts across Australia. The site provides external links with additional
information.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/agdHome.nsf/Page/
National_Security_National_Security_
http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/www/NationalSecurity.nsf
File(s) on CD:
N/A, navigate through the links above for further detail
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Report containing how Australia will be protecting against the terrorist threat; that
is, what Australia aims to achieve with respect to counter terrorism. The report was
produced by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and can be viewed (and
reproduced) in multiple formats.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.pmc.gov.au/publications/protecting_australia/index.htm
http://www.pmc.gov.au/publications/protecting_australia/docs/
protecting_australia.pdf
File(s) on CD:
Government\Federal\Attorney General's\Protecting Australia.pdf
Australia’s national counter terrorism plan, available in multiple formats.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/www/nationalsecurity.nsf/Page/Publications
http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/NationalSecurity.nsf/AllDocs
/85A16ADB86A23AD1CA256FC600072E6B?OpenDocument
File(s) on CD:
Government\Federal\Attorney General’s\Counter terrorism plan.doc
Link through to Emergency Management Australia, and more specifically the set of
publications/manuals, which can be downloaded in pdf format or ordered free of
charge on CD. Two example manuals are provided.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.ema.gov.au/agd/ema/emainternet.nsf/
AllDocs/2E6DD4ACF65D443CCA257156007ACEA0?OpenDocument#AEM
File(s) on CD:
Government\Federal\Attorney General’s\Evacuation planning.pdf
Government\Federal\Attorney General’s\Incident Management.pdf
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF)
Supply chain food production and trade statistics, from 2005.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.daff.gov.au/content/publications.cfm?Category=
Agricultural%20Industries%20and%20Food&ObjectID=A3D38C08-413A-4211B34B83CF5A8459C6
http://www.daff.gov.au/corporate_docs/publications/pdf/food/afs2005_
final_revised.pdf
File(s) on CD:
Government\Federal\DAFF\Food statistics.pdf
Publications section, containing information relating to categories including the
agricultural industries and food, national resource management, among others.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.daff.gov.au/content/publications.cfm
File(s) on CD:
N/A, use the above links to browse the vast publications library
Communications, Information Technology and the Arts (DCITA)
Fixed telephone services information and statistics.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.dcita.gov.au/tel/fixed_telephone_services
http://www.dcita.gov.au/tel/fixed_telephone_services/
publications_and_statistics_relevant_to_fixed_telephone_services
File(s) on CD:
N/A, refer to websites
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A large number of communications-related maps, including maps of mobile phone
coverage in Australia, metro broadband connect eligible areas video conferencing
facilities
Relevant link(s):
http://sdndiscovery.dcita.gov.au/midiscovery/
File(s) on CD:
Government\Federal\DCITA\Mobile coverage.gif
Government\Federal\DCITA\Sydney metro broadband.gif
Government\Federal\DCITA\Video conferencing.gif
Map of metropolitan and regional indigenous broadcasters.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.dcita.gov.au/home/research_and_statistics/research_
statistics_technology_unit
File(s) on CD:
Government\Federal\DCITA\Broadcasters.pdf
Maps of all Australian States and Territories highlighting the remoteness structure
of each region.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.dcita.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/39280/New_South_
Wales.pdf
http://www.dcita.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/39285/Victoria.pdf
http://www.dcita.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/39284/Tasmania.pdf
File(s) on CD:
Government\Federal\DCITA\Remote NSW.pdf
Government\Federal\DCITA\Remote Victoria.pdf
Government\Federal\DCITA\Remote Tasmania.pdf
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Defence
Defence annual report for 2005-2004 and Defence public environment report, both
of
which
contain
maps
concerning
Australia’s
significant
defence
bases/establishments.
Relevant link(s):

http://www.defence.gov.au/budget/04-05/dar/downloads/0405_DAR_08_append.pdf
File(s) on CD:
Government\Federal\Defence\Annual report.pdf
Government\Federal\Defence\Environment report.pdf
Navy video clips (and associated audio transcripts), which include such things as oil
terminal protection and current fleet footage.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.navy.gov.au/gallery/video/default.html
File(s) on CD:
Government\Federal\Defence\Oil terminal protection.mpg
Navy fleet and establishment locations with additional links to the units in the
particular area.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.navy.gov.au/fleet/map.html
http://www.navy.gov.au/establishments/
File(s) on CD:
Government\Federal\Defence\Fleet locations.jpg
Government\Federal\Defence\Establishment locations.jpg
Navy virtual fleet tour, containing behind the scenes information about the
operations of the Royal Australian Navy. Refer to the links below to access the
interactive tour.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.navy.gov.au/vf/
http://www.navy.gov.au/vf/vf.html
File(s) on CD:
Government\Federal\Defence\Virtual fleet tour 1.jpg
Government\Federal\Defence\Virtual fleet tour 1.jpg
Army video clips, including such things as communicating in the field, infantry and
vehicle safety testing.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.defence.gov.au/army/video/videos.htm
http://www.defence.gov.au/army/video/Comms1.mpg
File(s) on CD:
Government\Federal\Defence\Army communication.mpg
Australian Army website provides link to the defence library with many categories
including emergency management, and defence related statistics (and their
location).
Relevant link(s):
http://www.defence.gov.au/library/
File(s) on CD:
N/A, see link above
Air Force video clips, including such things as exercises and images of employees at
work.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.defence.gov.au/raaf/interactive/video.htm
File(s) on CD:
N/A, videos can be downloaded from the provided above
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Map of Royal Australian Air Force base locations around Australia.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.defence.gov.au/raaf/organisation/info_on/bases/index.htm
http://www.defence.gov.au/raaf/images/for_site/base_locations.jpg
File(s) on CD:
Government\Federal\Defence\Air Force bases.jpg
Link to DIGO (Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation). The site contains
geospatial data and maps that can be accessed/purchased from agencies such as
Geoscience Australia and the Geospatial Analysis Centre.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.defence.gov.au/digo/Products/ProductsDist.htm#gac
File(s) on CD:
N/A, refer to links on website above
Finance and Administration
Main site links through to the Australian Government Information Management
Office (AGIMO), which contains a guide for finding Government information. The
primary sources of Government information include the Australian Government
entry point, online directory and publications register. The publications register is
particularly
useful
for
searching
and
locating
statistics,
maps
and
documents/reports.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.agimo.gov.au/information/access
australia.gov.au
directoy.gov.au
publications.gov.au
File(s) on CD:
N/A, refer to the links above
The independent publications section of AGIMO provides guides and sources
relating to e-Government and information delivery, such as the 2006 e-Government
strategy.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.agimo.gov.au/publications
File(s) on CD:
N/A, see link above
Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT)
Monthly trade data for July 2006, found in the department’s publications section.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/
http://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/stats-pubs/mtd/australia_trade_0607.pdf
File(s) on CD:
Government\Federal\DFAT\Trade data.pdf
DFAT’s Market Information and Analysis Section provides current statistics and
information. For instance, statistics concerning Australia’s trade activities with the
Americas, Asia and Europe, in addition to others (see files below). The data can be
purchased in its entirety; however, extracts are available free of charge. Statistics
may also be tailored to suit various needs.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/statistics.html
File(s) on CD:
Government\Federal\DFAT\Americas trade statistics.pdf
Government\Federal\DFAT\Exports statistics.pdf
Government\Federal\DFAT\Trade topics statistics.pdf
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Link to Austrade website, allowing access to a searchable Suppliers Database (see
link). Also, refer to the provided file depicting a supplier search by the Energy and
Utilities industries.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.austrade.gov.au/
File(s) on CD:
Government\Federal\DFAT\Supplier database.jpg
Provides information and a link to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau, a body
that investigates and reports on transport facilities such as air, marine, rail and
road. Data available from the site includes (but is not limited to) Aviation data and
statistics. A customised version of the statistics can be accessed by filling out the
available request form.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.atsb.gov.au
File(s) on CD:
N/A, refer to link above
Link to the Australasian Railway Association. The data available on this site includes
an enlargeable map of the Australian rail network and document/report containing
information and a map of the Australian train radio systems.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.ara.net.au
http://www.ara.net.au/railnetwork.htm
http://www.ara.net.au/Rail%20Info_Railway%20Communications
%20Systems.htm
File(s) on CD:
Government\Federal\DFAT\Rail network map.pdf
Government\Federal\DFAT\Train radio systems.pdf
Environment and Heritage (DEH)
Information about cultural/heritage objects and places, such as museums, galleries
and libraries.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.deh.gov.au/soe/techpapers/places/sources2.html#table3-5
File(s) on CD:
N/A, refer to link provided
Link to the Australian Greenhouse Office and a map of operating power plants, as
well as links to renewable energy organisations and bodies (refer to second link).
Relevant link(s):
http://www.agso.gov.au/renewable/
http://www.greenhouse.gov.au/renewable/tools/index.html
File(s) on CD:
Government\Federal\DEH\Power plants.jpg
Transport and Regional Services (DOTARS)
Reference to the Bureau of Transport and Regional Economics. The Bureau permits
access to statistics on various areas on transport, including general transport,
aviation, land transport, maritime and regional. An example of the statistics
available is the up-to-date Australian transport statistics report for 2006 with maps
and associated data (see file provided).
Relevant link(s):
http://www.btre.gov.au/statistics/statsindex.aspx
http://www.btre.gov.au/statistics/general/trnstats05/trnstats.aspx
File(s) on CD:
Government\Federal\DOTARS\Transport statistics.pdf
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Maps on the Auslink road network and international airports and the railways and
sea ports across Australia.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.btre.gov.au/statistics/general/trnstats05/trnstats.aspx
http://www.btre.gov.au/statistics/general/trnstats05/auslink_intair.jpg
http://www.btre.gov.au/statistics/general/trnstats05/rail_seamap.jpg
File(s) on CD:
Government\Federal\DOTARS\Road & airports.jpg
Government\Federal\DOTARS\Railways & sea ports.jpg
Aviation statistics and airport traffic data, encompassing airline passenger statistics
for both international and domestic airlines.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.btre.gov.au/statistics/aviation.aspx
http://www.btre.gov.au/statistics/aviation/international_
time_series_downloads.aspx
http://www.btre.gov.au/statistics/aviation/domestic_
time_series_downloads.aspx
File(s) on CD:
Government\Federal\DOTARS\Flights & passengers.xls
Government\Federal\DOTARS\Domestic airlines.xls
Land transport statistics section, which provides links to external agencies such as
the Australian Bureau of Statistics and the Australasian Railway Association.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.btre.gov.au/statistics/statsindex.aspx
File(s) on CD:
N/A, refer to the link above
Maritime data, including shipping and ports statistics such as port-specific statistics.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.btre.gov.au/statistics/maritime.aspx
http://www.btre.gov.au/statistics/maritime/parc-fremantle.aspx
File(s) on CD:
Government\Federal\DOTARS\Port statistics.jpg
2006 report on regional Australia, including statistics, maps and explanations.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.btre.gov.au/statistics/regional/regstats/regstats.aspx
http://www.btre.gov.au/statistics/regional/regstats06/Australias_
Regions_06.pdf
File(s) on CD:
Government\Federal\DOTARS\Regional report.pdf
Products section, containing information about databases and other products
provided by the Department. An example database is the industry structure
database, which is openly available (see associated file). Also available are online,
searchable databases (refer to jpg file).
Relevant link(s):
http://www.btre.gov.au/products.aspx
http://www.btre.gov.au/docs/infopapers/ip49/ip49.aspx
http://dynamic.dotars.gov.au/btre/tedb/tablist.cfm
File(s) on CD:
Government\Federal\DOTARS\Industry structure database.xls
Government\Federal\DOTARS\Online database.jpg
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Industry, Tourism and Resources (DITR)
Resources and Energy section comprising information about the electricity supply,
energy, gas and Liquefied National Gas (LNG). This section also contains links to
internal and external websites for related resources; an example is to the
Ministerial Council on Energy.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.industry.gov.au/content/itrinternet/cms
indexpage.cfm?objectid=48A33771-20E0-68D8-ED841A1501D565E3
File(s) on CD:
N/A, refer to link
Link to Geoscience Australia, which contains a wealth of geospatial data and
mapping tools. Examples include map and excel file of renewable energy generators
across Australia.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.ga.gov.au/
http://www.ga.gov.au/renewable/
File(s) on CD:
Government\Federal\DITR\Renewable energy.xls
Government\Federal\DITR\Renewable energy.jpg
Australian map of existing and proposed gas pipelines. The map is highly scalable.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.industry.gov.au/assets/documents/itrinternet/Australian_
Pipelines_Map_200520050608162343.pdf
File(s) on CD:
Government\Federal\DITR\Gas pipelines.pdf

4.4.2 An Assessment of State Government Departments
The objective of this assessment is aligned with the previous, involving the profiling
of Government-related suppliers; however, the focus has shifted to the collection of CI-related
public data from State Government departments. New South Wales (NSW) is used as a
representative example (case study), as it was not feasible to extend the scope to include all
Australian states and territories for this thesis. The State Government Departments profiled in
greater depth are presented in Figure 4.3.
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State Government Data
Suppliers
Department of Education and Training
www.det.nsw.edu.au

Department of Energy, Utilities and Sustainability
www.deus.nsw.gov.au

Department of Lands
www.lands.nsw.gov.au

Department of Local Government
www.dlg.nsw.gov.au

Department of Planning
www.planning.nsw.gov.au

Department of Primary Industries
www.dpi.nsw.gov.au

Department of State and Regional Development
www.business.nsw.gov.au

Figure 4.3 State Government Data Supplying Agencies
Department of Education and Training
List of public schools by region. The link to each schools contains information such as
address, phone, fax, email, website, type of school, number of enrolments.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.schools.nsw.edu.au/schoolfind/locator/?section=
showRegion&region=538
http://www.schools.nsw.edu.au/schoolfind/locator/?section=
showRegion&region=538
File(s) on CD:
Government\State\Education & Training\Schools.txt
Statistical information about schools and students in NSW
Relevant link(s):
https://www.det.nsw.edu.au/reports_stats/stats/schools.htm
https://www.det.nsw.edu.au/media/downloads/reports_stats/stats/inbrief/
inbrief05.pdf
Files(s) on CD:
Government\State\Education & Training\School statistics.pdf
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Link to NSW Premier’s Department (www.premiers.nsw.gov.au), which contains data such
as a document containing information, images and maps concerning motorways in NSW and
a review of the provision of future motorways in the state.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.premiers.nsw.gov.au/TrainingAndResources/Publications/
publicationslist.htm
http://www.premiers.nsw.gov.au/NR/rdonlyres/EACD92DB-0A24-4D96-B7EC046930544047/0/Motorways2005.pdf
File(s) on CD:
Government\State\Education & Training\Motorways.pdf
The NSW Premier’s Department also contains a document from the Freight Infrastructure
Advisory Board proposing suggestions and images for new terminals and rail links.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.premiers.nsw.gov.au/TrainingAndResources/Publications/
publicationslist.htm
http://www.planning.nsw.gov.au/plansforaction/pdf/fiab_report.pdf
File(s) on CD:
Freight Infrastructure
Premier’s publication area contains a complete copy of the Sydney Water Inquiry, which
contains details on water treatment plants.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.premiers.nsw.gov.au/TrainingAndResources/Publications/
publicationslist.htm#Travel
File(s) on CD:
N/A, see the website above for a link to the report
Department of Energy, Utilities and Sustainability
List of local and metropolitan water utilities, and links to further information particularly
about the metropolitan water (Sydney Water and Hunter Water).
Relevant link(s):
http://www.deus.nsw.gov.au/water/Water%20Utilities/Water%20Utilities.asp
http://www.deus.nsw.gov.au/water/Water%20Utilities/Metropolitan
%20Water%20Utilities.asp#TopOfPage
File(s) on CD:
Government\State\Energy Utilities & Sustainability\Water utilities.txt
The link to Sydney Water allows information about the company’s areas of operation to be
accessed as a map.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.sydneywater.com.au/WhoWeAre/
http://www.sydneywater.com.au/OurSystemsAndOperations/AreaOfOperations.jpg
File(s) on CD:
Government\State\Energy Utilities & Sustainability\Sydney Water areas.jpg
Similarly, the link to the EnergyAustralia website contains an image of the utility company’s
electricity network.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.energyaustralia.com.au/energy/ea.nsf/Content/NSW+Home
http://www.energyaustralia.com.au/energy/ea.nsf/Content/
Network+Our+Distribution+Area
File(s) on CD:
Government\State\Energy Utilities & Sustainability\EnergyAustralia network.jpg
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List of and links to gas suppliers in NSW for additional information on the gas network, and
an explanation of how the gas network works in the state.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.deus.nsw.gov.au/Energy/Gas/Gas.asp
http://www.deus.nsw.gov.au/Energy/Gas/Gas%20Suppliers.asp
File(s) on CD:
Government\State\Energy Utilities & Sustainability\Gas suppliers.txt
List of and links to electricity suppliers in NSW to gain additional information on the
electricity suppliers and network.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.deus.nsw.gov.au/Energy/Electricity/Electricity.asp
http://www.deus.nsw.gov.au/Energy/Electricity/Electricity%20Suppliers.
asp#TopOfPage
File(s) on CD:
Government\State\Energy Utilities & Sustainability\Electricity suppliers.txt
Department of Lands
Lands Spatial Portal provides access to browser-based tools to access addressing mapping
tools allowing an online query to be created and a specific addressed to be search. The
search yields a scaled map, containing data such as address point, emergency facility,
suburb boundary, LGA, road, property, strata, national park, state forest. The file provided
below contains a search for a major street in Wollongong: Crown Street. The second link
facilitates access to the addressing tool.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.maps.nsw.gov.au/
http://address.maps.nsw.gov.au/AVSWebClient/faces/index.jsp
File(s) on CD:
Government\State\Lands\Address search.jpg
Access to GSP (the geometry application), which uses three key layered datasets including
cadastral, topographic and imagery and can be accessed via the link below. The file
provided gives a representation of how this aspect of the Land Spatial Portal can be used.
Relevant link(s):
http://gsp.maps.nsw.gov.au/viewer.htm
File(s) on CD:
Government\State\Lands\Geospatial portal.jpg
Link to the Geographic Names Board of NSW, which contains two downloadable files of the
Geographic Names Register; a file comprehensive place name database of NSW.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.gnb.nsw.gov.au
http://www.gnb.nsw.gov.au/name/search
File(s) on CD:
Government\State\Lands\GNR 1.csv
Government\State\Lands\GNR 2.csv
Department of Local Government
Excel file containing local Council contact details in NSW, including links to independent
Council websites, which provide more detailed information about the area.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.dlg.nsw.gov.au/dlg/dlghome/dlg_InformationIndex.asp?
areaindex=DOWNLOADS&index=200
File(s) on CD:
Government\State\Local Government\NSW Councils.xls
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Excel file containing local Council contact details in Sydney, including links to independent
Council websites, which provide more detail information about the area.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.dlg.nsw.gov.au/dlg/dlghome/dlg_InformationIndex.asp?
areaindex=DOWNLOADS&index=200
File(s) on CD:
Government\State\Local Government\Sydney Councils.xls
Map of Councils in NSW, grouped by region.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.dlg.nsw.gov.au/dlg/dlghome/dlg_InformationIndex.asp?
areaindex=DOWNLOADS&index=201
http://www.dlg.nsw.gov.au/dlg/dlghome/documents/Downloads/MAP_
LOCALAREASINNSWCOLOURED.jpg
File(s) on CD:
Government\State\Local Government\Regional Council map.jpg
Map of the local Council boundaries.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.dlg.nsw.gov.au/dlg/dlghome/dlg_InformationIndex.asp?
areaindex=DOWNLOADS&index=201
http://www.dlg.nsw.gov.au/dlg/dlghome/documents/Downloads/
MAP_LGANSW_BW_OCT2004.jpg
File(s) on CD:
Government\State\Local Government\Local Council boundaries.jpg
Excel file containing comparative information about local Councils.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.dlg.nsw.gov.au/dlg/dlghome/dlg_comptime.asp
File(s) on CD:
Government\State\Local Government\Comparative Councils.xls
Department of Planning
Identifies and provides information about the Transport and Population Data Centre,
enabling reports and information to be collected relating to transport and employment in the
NSW. A majority of the information is in electronic format; however, a number of resources
must be purchased.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.planning.nsw.gov.au/tpdc/regional-data.asp
http://www.planning.nsw.gov.au/tpdc/publications.asp
File(s) on CD:
N/A
Transport and Population Data Centre report concerning the trips flows into Sydney and
other regional areas, which includes statistics, maps and graphs.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.planning.nsw.gov.au/tpdc/publications.asp
http://www.planning.nsw.gov.au/tpdc/pdfs/transfigures_march_2006.pdf
File(s) on CD:
Government\State\Planning\Trips.pdf
Transport and Population Data Centre report on the travel habits of Newcastle, Illawarra and
Sydney residents.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.planning.nsw.gov.au/tpdc/publications.asp
http://www.planning.nsw.gov.au/tpdc/pdfs/transfigures_dec2005.pdf
File(s) on CD:
Government\State\Planning\Travel habits.pdf
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Publications catalogue containing resources under the following categories: 1:100 000 maps
and reports, 1:250 000 maps and reports, conferences, development assessment,
environmental land use, housing, metropolitan planning- catchments and waterways,
metropolitan planning- by region, regional planning- catchments and waterways, regional
NSW planning- by region and population projects. Note that various publications require a
fee for access.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.planning.nsw.gov.au/asp/pubslist.asp?cat=Water
File(s) on CD:
N/A
Links to other sources of transport data, such as to the Australian Bureau of Statistics,
CityRail, Austroads and the Bureau of Transport and Regional Economics.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.planning.nsw.gov.au/tpdc/links.asp
http://www.austroads.com.au/
http://www.abs.gov.au
http://www.btre.gov.au/index.aspx
File(s) on CD:
Government\State\Planning\Transport data links.txt
Department of Primary Industries
Map of mines and associated major projects in Australia.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.dpi.nsw.gov.au/minerals/resources/mineral/map-major-metallic
File(s) on CD:
Government\State\Primary Industries\Mines.jpg
Map showing advanced mineral projects and exploration highlights in NSW, based on recent
figures.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.dpi.nsw.gov.au/aboutus/resources/maps/minerals_maps/minerals-andpetroleum-project-maps
http://www.dpi.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/45177/Mineral-Projects-Map-Sept-06.pdf
File(s) on CD:
Government\State\Primary Industries\Minerals.pdf
Map showing advanced petroleum projects and exploration highlights in NSW, based on
current figures.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.dpi.nsw.gov.au/aboutus/resources/maps/minerals_maps/minerals-andpetroleum-project-maps
http://www.dpi.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/45179/a3-petroleumprojectsmapfeb2006.pdf
File(s) on CD:
Government\State\Primary Industries\Petroleum.pdf
Map of the major coalfields in NSW, which are used as energy resources for the State’s
main industrial centres.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.dpi.nsw.gov.au/aboutus/resources/maps
http://www.dpi.nsw.gov.au/minerals/resources/coal/coalfields
File(s) on CD:
Government\State\Primary Industries\Coalfields.jpg
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Products and Services section containing a comprehensive set of Geoscience databases,
maps, petroleum data (in addition to other resources), a majority of which can be
purchased by filling in an order form.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.minerals.nsw.gov.au/prodServices
File(s) on CD:
N/A, use the above link to access information about the products and services
Department of State and Regional Development
Facts and statistics section on categories such as economic and business climate, trade and
investment, labour and ethnic diversity, infrastructure and business and quality of life. Most
of the resources in this section are in summarised statistical form. Also provides a link to
relevant websites for further information, such as the Australian Bureau of Statistics and
Tourism NSW.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.business.nsw.gov.au/facts.asp
http://www.business.nsw.gov.au/business.asp?cid=168
http://www.abs.gov.au
http://www.tourism.nsw.gov.au/home/
File(s) on CD:
N/A, summarised statistics can be accessed from the first link
Regions of NSW profiles, containing information about the specific region’s infrastructure,
industries, transport, labour and major networks, including appropriate links to external
sites.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.business.nsw.gov.au/regions.asp
File(s) on CD:
Government\State\State & Regional Development\Regional profile example.txt
Links (external) to the major transport facilities in NSW, such as CityRail, FreightCorp, Port
Kembla Port Corporation, Newcastle Port Corporation, Roads and Traffic authority and
Sydney Ports. This allows for the collection of specific information concerning each of the
individual corporations.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.business.nsw.gov.au/business.asp?cid=164
File(s) on CD:
N/A, see link above
CityRail operations details, including a map of the CityRail/NSW train network.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.cityrail.nsw.gov.au/networkmaps/selection.jsp
File(s) on CD:
Government\State\State & Regional Development\Train network.png
Government\State\State & Regional Development\Train network.pdf
Sydney Ports statistics, including trade statistics and comprehensive overview report.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.sydneyports.com.au/TradeLogistics/main.asp?pageid=144
http://www.sydneyports.com.au/TradeLogistics/PDF/Trade_Aug06.pdf
http://www.sydneyports.com.au/TradeLogistics/PDF/c&lfinal0405.pdf
File(s) on CD:
Government\State\State & Regional Development\Trade statistics.pdf
Government\State\State & Regional Development\Trade overview.pdf
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4.4.3 Government Evaluation
The Government data collection process highlighted the ease with which data can be
collected from Government-related websites. Core components of the Government’s role are
to ensure the nation’s security and facilitate access to information. The assessment presented
the issue of whether the national security process and in particular critical infrastructure
protection can potentially be impeded by the availability of critical infrastructure data. More
specifically, where the data collection process presented can be carried out more exhaustively
by individuals intent on compromise Australia’s CI for various reasons such as vandalism,
competitive intelligence, theft, fraud and terrorism. Chapter two introduced the concept of
reaching a balance between open information access and data access restrictions/censorship in
the interest of national security, and this is increasingly important given the outcomes of the
data collection phase.
Therefore this balance can only be achieved if a number of questions are asked, and more
importantly answered with respect to Government agencies:
-

How much data should be provided to the public? Is it necessary that Government be
completely open to the public in view of data provisioning?

-

Should data be provided to community members based on their profile or need for the
data? Should data be openly available to all citizens?

-

Can data be categorised based on its sensitive, and the appropriate restrictions be
applied?

-

Is public data availability and e-Government impeding the critical infrastructure
protection process?

-

What are the future steps for Government with respect to this situation?

4.5 Commercial
Commercial data suppliers are bodies that provide products and/or services to their
customers for a certain price, and under particular conditions. More importantly, they are
involved in providing Government with data, which is ultimately purchased for internal
Government and public use. The commercial bodies of interest to this study are those that
provide information about critical infrastructure, or physical entities at a specific location.
That is, they are involved in the provision of spatial data that can be represented on a map,
with the associated geographic coordinates.
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This section assesses four of the major commercial data suppliers in Australia (see
Figure 4.4), listing the company’s profile, and performing an analysis of the products and/or
services they offer. In cases where data is available without a fee, the security mechanisms
encountered were also recorded for further analysis in the following chapter. It is important to
note that the list of commercial data supplying agencies identified is not complete, but rather
is used to illustrate the commercial public data situation, and provide an overview of the types
of products and data that can be acquired.

Commercial Data
Suppliers

MapData Sciences
http://www.mapds.com.au/

PSMA (G-NAF)
http://www.psma.com.au/
http://www.psma.com.au/g-naf

Sensis
http://www.sensis.com.au/

MapInfo
http://www.mapinfo.com.au

Figure 4.4 Commercial Data Supplying Agencies

4.5.1 MapData Sciences
MapData Sciences offers “Business Mapping Solutions” primarily for the Australian
and New Zealand markets, through multiple delivery mediums such as online and as a web
service (MapData Science, 2006). The company is a digital mapping provider for sectors such
as Government, transport and telecommunications. The major MapData Sciences products are
identified and described below in table format.
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Map Data Sciences Products
QuickLocate® 3 Geocoder
Converts addresses into geographic coordinates.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.mapds.com.au/products_quicklocate.shtml
File(s) on CD:
N/A
RoadNet Digital Street Data
Street database with associated layers containing information such as transport,
towns and points of interest.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.mapds.com.au/products_roadnet.shtml
File(s) on CD:
Commercial\MapData Sciences\Melbourne.jpg
G-NAF Address Table
“G-NAF, the Geocoded National Address File, is Australia's authoritative address
index of suburb, street, number, and geocode (latitude/longitude) information.” GNAF is a PSMA product, but is resold by MapData Sciences with additional attributes
such as postcode.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.mapds.com.au/products_gnaf.shtml
File(s) on CD:
N/A
Administrative Boundary Data
Includes maps and data relating to suburbs and localities, postcodes, local
government authorities (LGA) boundaries and cadastral/property parcel boundaries.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.mapds.com.au/products_adminbdys.shtml
File(s) on CD:
Commercial\MapData Sciences\Suburbs.gif
Commercial\MapData Sciences\Postcodes.gif

4.5.2 PSMA (G-NAF)
PSMA is involved in “facilitating the creation of and access to seamless national
spatial datasets for government, industry and community use” (PSMA, 2006). PSMA
possesses five key dataset, all of which are resold through the company’s reseller network,
one of the most notable being G-NAF, which is The Geocoded National Address File.
PSMA’s major datasets are profiled.
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PSMA/G-NAF Products
Administrative Boundaries
Contains boundaries information in a number of themes, including Australian
Bureau of Statistics (ABS) boundaries, Electoral boundaries, Local Government
Areas, Suburbs/Localities and State boundaries. For more information, refer to the
product description document provided.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.psma.com.au/datasets
http://www.psma.com.au/datasets/administrative-boundaries
File(s) on CD:
Commercial\PSMA\Admin boundaries.pdf
Points of Interest
A dataset comprising details about items such as cultural, defence, emergency,
medical, post offices, sewage, transport and utilities points of interest. Refer to the
metadata file for more additional dataset details.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.psma.com.au/datasets
http://www.psma.com.au/datasets/points-of-interest
File(s) on CD:
Commercial\PSMA\Points of interest.pdf
G-NAF®
This data set comprises all physical addresses within Australia, each associated with
the appropriate geographic coordinates. The G-NAF product description file is
provided.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.psma.com.au/datasets
http://www.psma.com.au/datasets/g-naf
File(s) on CD:
Commercial\PSMA\GNAF/pdf
CadLite®
Information relating to Australia’s land parcels including suburb names and
boundary locations. The product description file provided describes this dataset in
detail.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.psma.com.au/datasets
http://www.psma.com.au/datasets/cadlite
File(s) on CD:
Commercial\PSMA\CadLite.pdf
Transport & Topography™
The transport component of the dataset contains information about roads, rail, rail
stations and airport network, and the topography component includes data about
water bodies, major rivers, minor waters and oceans. A more detailed description
can be accessed using the file below.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.psma.com.au/datasets
http://www.psma.com.au/datasets/transport-topography
File(s) on CD:
Commercial\PSMA\Transport & topography.pdf
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4.5.3 Sensis
Sensis provides a suite of searchable products (both free and commercial) that allow
for products, businesses, places, people and information to be located (Sensis, 2006a). The
available Sensis products and solutions are described in detail.

Sensis Products
Sensis 1234
Telephone service used to locate business and residential information.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.about.sensis.com.au/products/sensis_1234.php
File(s) on CD:
N/A
Yellow™
Business listing site, offering 6 metropolitan directories and 50 regional directories.
Provides the ability to search for businesses by address, map based or by browsing
the available categories, as shown in the file below.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.about.sensis.com.au/products/yellowpages.php
http://www.yellowpages.com.au
File(s) on CD:
Commercial\Sensis\Yellow\Category search.jpg
White Pages®
Business and residential contact information, with over 8 million details stored in
the database. There exists both an online and commercial services; the difference
being that the commercials service offers high-speed access through a subscription
based agreement. Enables the searching of categories by state, such as the search
of Victoria for Utilities.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.about.sensis.com.au/products/whitepages.php
http://www.whitepages.com.au
File(s) on CD:
Commercial\Sensis\White Pages\Utilities.jpg
Whereis®
Provides location and navigation features, and offers a number of solutions
including navigation, digital mapping, online services and business applications. A
number of Whereis files, screens and maps are provided.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.about.sensis.com.au/products/whereis.php
http://www.whereis.com.au
File(s) on CD:
Commercial\Sensis\Whereis\CI search.jpg
Commercial\Sensis\Whereis\Sydney hospitals.gif
Commercial\Sensis\Whereis\Sydney police stations.gif
Sensis® Business Information Services
Offers customer data to businesses and the Government sector. The data can be
accessed, conditioned, analysed and monitored.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.about.sensis.com.au/products/businfoservices.php
File(s) on CD:
N/A
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4.5.4 MapInfo
MapInfo is an International commercial supplier that provides country and locationspecific data targeted at the business and Government community. MapInfo software, and
data products are intended to allow users to visualise map-based entities, and allow for
improved decision-making (MapInfo, 2006a). MapInfo is used by a number of global
government agencies, and is focused on promoting e-government services that can integrate
with MapInfo. It is designed primarily for use in national security and business continuity
applications, most notably the location of critical infrastructure items. The software is
applicable to all stages of the risk assessment process, from detection through to recovery
(MapInfo, 2006b). Applicable MapInfo products and services have been identified, and
described.

MapInfo Products
Data
Offers maps and data including street, demographics, postal, and administrative
boundaries data. Australian related products in the data category include StreetPro®
Australia, MapMarker® Australia and Postcodes Australia. Example maps are
provided.
Relevant link(s):
http://extranet.mapinfo.com/products/products_index.cfm?
productcategoryid=21
File(s) on CD:
Commercial\MapInfo\StreetPro Brisbane.gif
Commercial\MapInfo\MapMarker.jpg
Commercial\MapInfo\Postcodes.jpg

Software
The core product is MapInfo Professional, which allows for mapping and geographic
analysis
Relevant link(s):
http://www.mapinfo.com.au/location/integration?txtTopNav=db6a136cc2867f00devvcm100001a031dc7____
File(s) on CD:
N/A

4.5.5 Commercial Evaluation
It is significant at this point to reiterate the link between the Government and
Commercial data sectors. Whilst data is available from the commercial bodies for a fee,
Government agencies heavily rely on the Commercial sector for their data, and particularly
mapping needs. Consequently, data and maps produced by Government are in some instances
widely available for public access, use and distribution. This creates a situation where the link
between the Government and Commercial data supplying agencies is becoming less defined
(or blurred), and data is increasingly being made available to the extent that purchasing
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location-specific and CI-related data seems unnecessary, as free data is made available on the
websites of Government Departments.
An additional crucial point is that any individual can access commercial data,
provided that they have the necessary funds. With respect to an individual intent on causing
harm, it is clear that no mechanisms screen the individual, and prohibit them from accessing
the datasets. The motivation for suppliers in this category is evidently monetary; however the
following question must be posed: does gaining profit from the distribution of CI-related
datasets justify compromising the CIP process, and introducing national security concerns?
Additionally, should there be stringent mechanisms in place to manage the individuals
accessing CI-related data to ensure that any risks are minimised?
Government and Commercially accessed data can further be supplemented with
information collected from the owners and operators of critical infrastructure items. These
bodies generally seek to educate the community about their products/services, but are
‘unintentionally’ providing revealing information about their operations and infrastructure.
For instance, some agencies are making available information relating to energy networks in
an attempt to be transparent with their customers, but are in turn creating a risk in providing
such information. To demonstrate the nature of this data provision, a number of the major
utility companies and telecommunications providers are assessed. The names, and related web
addresses of the organisations were located through Australian and State Government
websites.

4. 6 Utility Companies
Utility companies refer to organisations involved in providing energy (electricity and
gas) and water-related services to the community. The major utility companies throughout
Australia are introduced in the Figure 4.5.
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Utility Companies Data
Suppliers
Sydney Water
http://www.sydneywater.com.au/

Hunter Water
http://www.hunterwater.com.au/

Integral Energy
http://www.integral.com.au/

Energy Australia
http://www.energy.com.au/energy/ea.nsf/Content/Splash

AGL
http://www.agl.com.au/AGLNew/default.htm

Figure 4.5 Utility Companies Data Supplying Agencies
The websites of the utility companies have been examined, and a profile has been
created for each data supplier. The profiles are similar to those produced for the Federal and
State Government agencies, and highlight the public information made available by the
suppliers.

Sydney Water
Sydney Water area of operations map.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.sydneywater.com.au/OurSystemsAndOperations/
AreaOfOperations.jpg
File(s) on CD:
Utility Companies\Sydney Water\Area of operations.jpg
Wastewater information, and map of sewage treatment plants.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.sydneywater.com.au/OurSystemsandOperations/
File(s) on CD:
Utility Companies\Sydney Water\Sewage treatment plants.pdf
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List of treatment plants operated by Sydney Water, and associated information.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.sydneywater.com.au/OurSystemsAndOperations/Wastewater
TreatmentPlants/Coastal.cfm
File(s) on CD:
N/A, see provided link
Water catchments, filtration plants and pumping stations map, including a filtration
plants overview document with map.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.sydneywater.com.au/OurSystemsAndOperations/WaterFiltrationPlants/
File(s) on CD:
Utility Companies\Sydney Water\Water.pdf
Utility Companies\Sydney Water\Filtration overview.pdf
Sydney Water supplier system illustration, each element can be clicked for
additional information and annual reports and associated publications. A static
image has been provided.
Relevant link(s);
http://www.sydneywater.com.au/OurSystemsAndOperations/WaterSystems/
File(s) on CD:
Utility Companies\Sydney Water\Supply system.gif

Hunter Water
Current storage supply and performance statistics.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.hunterwater.com.au/ssp.asp
File(s) on CD:
N/A, see link
Dam fact sheets; for instance, Grahamstown Dam (refer to the pdf file below)
Relevant link(s):
http://www.hunterwater.com.au/brochures.asp
http://www.hunterwater.com.au/docs/reports/Grahamstown%
20Fact%20Sheet%20FINAL%20Oct%2004_2004914.pdf
File(s) on CD:
Utility Companies\Hunter Water\Dam fact sheet.pdf
Treatment plant upgrade information and diagrams.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.hunterwater.com.au/brochures.asp
http://www.hunterwater.com.au/docs/reports/rayter.pdf
File(s) on CD:
Utility Companies\Hunter Water\Treatment plant.pdf
Area of operation map allowing a customer centre or catchment to be clicked for
further information.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.hunterwater.com.au/operations.asp
File(s) on CD:
Utility Companies\Hunter Water\Area of operation.jpg
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Integral Energy
Network area maps.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.integral.com.au/index.cfm?objectid=8A0DAD5D-208F-4BCEB3D5DE1FB8D560CB
File(s) on CD:
Utility Companies\Integral Energy\Network area 1.gif
Utility Companies\Integral Energy\Network area 2.gif
Link to Energy related websites, such as Australian Energy Market Commission and
the Department of Energy, Utilities and Sustainability.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.integral.com.au/index.cfm?objectid=469804B7-380C-443289709D01162A5AFA
File(s) on CD:
N/A, refer to link for website details

Energy Australia
Map of energy distribution network.
Relevant link(s):

http://www.energy.com.au/energy/ea.nsf/Content/Network+home
http://www.energy.com.au/energy/ea.nsf/Content/Network+Our+Distribution+Area
File(s) on CD:

Utility companies\Energy Australia\Energy distribution network.jpg
Map of proposed upgrades to the electricity network. An example of a street route
map for Newcastle CBD is offered.
Relevant link(s):

http://www.energy.com.au/energy/ea.nsf/Content/Network+Newcastle+
CBD+%26+surround+supply+upgrade
File(s) on CD:

Utility companies\Energy Australia\Proposed map.jpg

AGL
AGL general information and map of the AGL gas distribution network.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.agl.com.au/AGLNew/About+AGL/Energy+networks/default.htm
http://www.agl.com.au/AGLNew/About+AGL/Energy+networks/AGL+Gas+
Networks/default.htm
File(s) on CD:
Utility Companies\AGL\Gas distribution network.pdf
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List of electricity distribution by postcode, and suburb order (as shown in the jpg
screenshot file).
Relevant link(s):
http://www.agl.com.au/AGLNew/About+AGL/Energy+networks/default.htm
http://www.agl.com.au/AGLNew/About+AGL/Energy+networks/AGL+Electricity+
Networks/default.htm
File(s) on CD:
Utility Companies\AGL\Electricity distribution.jpg
Mapping of AGL’s generation assets.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.agl.com.au/AGLNew/About+AGL/Generation+assets/default.htm
File(s) on CD:
Utility Companies\AGL\Generation assets.jpg
More detailed information about generation assets, such as hydro electric map of
NSW (provided) and detailed description of each power station on the map.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.agl.com.au/AGLNew/About+AGL/Generation+assets/Hydro+
electric+power/default.htm
File(s) on CD:
Utility Companies\AGL\Hydro assets.gif

4.7 Telecommunications Providers
The major telecommunications providers in Australia (see Figure 4.6) have been
profiled in terms of their role in public data availability. As with the utility companies,
telecommunications companies provide public information solely for the role of educating the
community, and promoting their services and networks.

Telecommunications Providers
Data Suppliers
Telstra
http://www.telstra.com/index.jsp

Optus
http://www.optus.com.au/portal/site/oca

Figure 4.6 Telecommunications Providers Data Supplying Agencies
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Telstra
Description of the various facets of Telstra’s network and infrastructure, facts and
figures section and video (media) sections with clips such as the Telstra Country
Wide Headquarters.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.telstra.com.au/abouttelstra/corp/infrastructure.cfm#Network
http://www.telstra.com.au/abouttelstra/corp/facts.cfm
http://www.telstra.com.au/abouttelstra/media/footage.cfm
File(s) on CD:
N/A, refer to links
Set of interactive coverage maps. A number of examples are provided, each map
shown at a different level of detail.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.telstra.com.au/mobile/networks/coverage/index.htm?
showmap=TRUE&state=nsw#
http://www.telstra.com.au/mobile/networks/coverage/tsii_state.cfm
File(s) on CD:
Telecommunications\Telstra\Coverage map 1.jpg
Telecommunications\Telstra\Coverage map 2.jpg
Telecommunications\Telstra\Coverage map 3.jpg
Telecommunications\Telstra\NSW & ACT coverage map.jpg

Optus
Network coverage maps for various locations around Australia (see link). An
example of 3G network coverage in Adelaide is provided.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.optus.com.au/portal/site/aboutoptus
File(s) on CD:
Telecommunications\Optus\Adelaide 3G coverage.jpg
Broadband coverage map.
Relevant link(s):
http://optusbusiness.com.au/businessbroadband/coverage.asp#
File(s) on CD:
Telecommunications\Optus\Broadband coverage.gif
Optus mobile coverage map for NSW.
Relevant link(s):
http://www.optus.com.au/portal/site/aboutoptus/
menuitem.cfa0247099a6f722d0b61a108c8ac7a0/?
vgnextoid=008f987010297010VgnVCM10000029867c0aRCRD
File(s) on CD:
Telecommunications\Optus\Mobile coverage NSW.jpg

4.8 The Public Data Availability Situation in Australia
This supplier identification, and data collection phase was employed primarily to
assess the disparate sources of public data in Australia. It is evident from the assessment that
data can be provided deliberately or unintentionally, and can in both instances be reproduced.
Data files, independently, may not appear particularly useful but as the profile tables and CD
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show, when stored with data from various other sources result in a structured repository of
data relating to Australia’s critical infrastructure (Figure 4.7).

Physical data

Federal Government Data

State Government Data

Australia Critical Infrastructure
Data Repository

Commercial Data

Utility Company Data

Telecommunications Providers Data

Other Data (not examined in this study)

Figure 4.7 Structured CI Data Repository
A repository of this nature allows for various characteristics of Australia’s CI, both
individual and collective, to emerge. Such characteristics include previously unconsidered
patterns, interdependency information and vital data that may be revealing and compromise
the CIP process, thus affect national security. This structured process of collection can be
replicated by any individual requiring little resources, and can be made more exhaustive and
detailed with the appropriate funds and dedicated time. Therefore, an individual can engage in
various preparations and activities with little inconvenience and detection, using publicly
accessible information that was originally made available for the benefit of the public and to
encourage openness in initiatives such as e-Government. The data collected in this chapter is
essentially in its raw form; that is no attempt has been made to manipulate to the data and
establish patterns or inferences for the purpose of creating scenarios and understanding the
characteristics and linkages between infrastructure items. It is merely an initial repository of
Australia’s critical infrastructure-related data, collected from publicly available outlets. A
comparison of the data available, the specific data elements, and the CI type(s) at risk is
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provided in Table 4.1 to demonstrate the relevance of the public data collection exercise to
Australia’s CI.

Table 4.1 Comparison of Public Data and the Threat to CI
Supplier Type/Title

Federal/ Attorney General’s
Department

Federal/ Agriculture,
Fisheries & Forestry
Federal/Communication
Information Technology &
the Arts
Federal/Defence
Federal/Finance and
Administration
Federal/ Foreign Affairs &
Trade
Federal/Environment &
Heritage
Federal/Transport &
Regional Services

Federal/ Industry, Tourism
& Resources
State/Department of
Education & Training

State/Department of
Energy, Utilities &
Sustainability

Major Data Elements
(Attributes) Available

What CI is at Risk?

- Counter terrorism report &
plan
- Links to Emergency
Management Australia & a set
of publications/links
- Food production & trade
statistics
- Telephone services
- Communications maps

- All infrastructure types

- Defence establishments
- Video clips
- e-Government information

- Government

- Trade statistics
- Rail report
- Rail network map
- Supplier database
- Culture objects & places
information
- Power plant maps
- Renewable energy
- 2006 transport statistics
report
- Transport map
- Road, airport & rail network
maps
- Airline statistics
- Shipping & ports statistics
- Regional data
- Energy supply details
- Spreadsheet of renewable
energy operators
- Gas pipelines
- Searchable public school
database
- Statistical education
information
- Motorways in NSW (existing
& proposed)
- Freight & Rail infrastructure
data
- Local & metropolitan water
utilities list
- Sydney Water operations
map
- Energy Australia electricity
network map
- Gas network information
- List of electricity suppliers

- Transport
- All infrastructure types
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- Communications
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- Cultural icons
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- Schools
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State/Department of Lands

State/Department of Local
Government

State/Department of
Planning
State/Department of
Primary Industries
State/Department of State
& Regional Development

Commercial/MapData
Sciences
Commercial/PSMA, G-NAF

Commercial/Sensis

Commercial/MapInfo
Utility Companies/Sydney
Water

Utility Companies/Hunter
Water

Utility Companies/Integral
Energy
Utility Companies/Energy
Australia
Utility Companies/AGL
Telecommunications
Providers/Telstra
Telecommunications
Providers/Optus

- Mapping tool for locating
things such as roads,
properties & national parks
- Geographic names register
CSV file
- Excel file of Council contact
details
- Detailed Council information
by region
- Councils map
- Transport & population
statistics, maps & graphs
- Travel habits report
- Map of mines
- Petroleum, coal mines &
energy maps & resources
- Economic, trade,
infrastructure & business
statistics & facts
- Regional profile, with
transport and major networks
information
- NSW train network
- Ports data
- Address locator
- Street database, containing
transport, towns & points of
interest data
- Points of interest, such as
cultural, defence, emergency,
medical, post offices, sewage,
transport and utilities
- Physical addresses datasets
- Transport dataset
- Telephone service
- Business & residential
information
- Points of interest maps
- Streets, demographics, postal
& administrative boundaries
data
- Area of operations map
- Sewage treatment plants
map
- Water filtration & treatment
plants information
- Supply & performance
statistics
- Dam fact sheets
- Treatment plant diagrams
- Area of operations map
- Network area maps
- Network map
- Proposed upgrades to
electricity network map
- Gas distribution network
- Network information
- Interactive coverage maps
- Network coverage maps
- Broadband network map
- Mobile coverage in NSW
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(particularly transport)

- Government

- Transport
- Energy
- All infrastructure types
(particularly transport)

- All infrastructure types

- All infrastructure types

- All infrastructure types

- All infrastructure types
- Water

- Water
- Dams

- Energy
- Energy
- Electricity
-

Gas
Communications
Cyber infrastructure
Communications
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In addition to the comparison in the table, the use of a geographic information system
(GIS) can allow for the data elements to be further combined through the use of longitude and
latitude coordinates, associating the data to a particular location. This allows for a graphical,
map-based representation of CI-related data to be created, also allowing for detailed analysis
of the data.

4.9 Conclusion
The outcome of this chapter has been the identification of data supplying categories
and agencies in Australia, and the creation of a data repository containing information relating
to the country’s CI. The examination highlighted the ease with which data could be collected,
and the potential for more detailed data and analysis through commercial agencies. A
majority of the data has been provided for positive purposes; however, it appears that this
level of transparency could provide a threat or negative implications for the critical
infrastructure protection process (identified in previous chapters). Throughout this phase of
data collection, the security mechanisms encountered at each of the websites have been
recorded, to allow for further analysis of public data availability to be conducted. Chapter 5
will assess these security mechanisms through the use of a content analysis of the securityrelated documents, which were the primary methods used to govern access to the public data
collected. A discussion of the technical and non-technical public data-related security
techniques will be presented. In addition, the data collected in this Chapter will assist in
creating scenarios in the following chapter using a number of counter-terrorism techniques,
and the implications of this analysis will be deliberated on.

-79-

The Threat of Public Data Availability on Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP), and the Level of
Awareness Amongst Security Experts in Australia

Chapter Five
Security Mechanisms and the Threat of Public Data
Manipulation
5.1 Introduction
The objective of this chapter is to discuss the security-related mechanisms
encountered during the data collection process described in chapter 4. Various security
techniques were identified, such as password-protected access, licencing schemes and written
documentation, the latter being the most prominent form. Consequently, a content analysis of
twenty-five written security-related documents was conducted to identify the main themes
and fundamental concepts collectively raised by the data supplying entities. The major
concepts and clusters will be discussed in greater detail and the effectiveness of the written
documentation in minimising the threat of public data availability will be examined. Despite
the intentions of such security techniques, it is clear that the capacity to manipulate public
data is present; it is possible to engage in the creation of threat scenarios using tools such as
electronic data management and processing, and geospatial information exploitation. A
number of scenarios are provided for demonstrative purposes, all of which are concerned with
describing the threat of public data availability on CIP by indicating the manner in which
Australia’s CI can be compromised utilising the data from the previous chapter. It is evident
that existing security techniques must be reviewed in greater detail to appreciate the realistic
nature of public data access. A structured means of evaluating and improving the mechanisms
is offered through the Public Data Protection Lifecycle.

5.2 Public Data Security Techniques
Throughout the process of collecting public data concerning Australia’s critical
infrastructure (chapter 4), a number of security techniques were discovered. They primarily
comprise
i.

password-protected access,

ii.

registration/licencing; and

iii.

written documentation.
When considering the security techniques, it is crucial to indicate that the methods

employed do not deter an individual from openly accessing the available data with ease. The
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most ‘stringent’ techniques that were encountered included accepting terms and conditions,
password-protected access and a multi-staged registration/licencing process as demonstrated
by the Department of Lands, Department of Communication Information Technology and the
Arts and Geoscience Australia respectively.
The Department of Lands provides access to the Lands Spatial Portal, which requires
the user to consent to the department’s terms and conditions (see Figure 5.1). The process of
accessing the data is simple, requiring the user to select the ‘Accept’ option with no further
agreements, licences or policies to be read.

Please see print copy for Figure 5.1

Source: Department of Lands (2006)

Figure 5.1 Department of Lands Security Mechanisms
The Department of Communication, Information Technology and the Arts (DCITA)
makes use of a disclaimer, and password protection mechanisms for maps such as fixed
infrastructure, internet access facilities, and internet points of presence (refer to Figure 5.2).
This process is more effective than that of the Department of Lands; however, it is worth
noting that not all DCITA maps are password-protected. That is, only select maps are
restricted for internal use, while others can be openly gathered.
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Password Protected Access

Please see print copy for Figure 5.2

Source: DCITA (2006)

Figure 5.2 DCITA Security Mechanisms
Geoscience Australia utilises an alternative process of registration/licencing, which is
the most comprehensive method encountered during the data collection phase. This process
involves multiple steps as highlighted in Figure 5.3. The user is required to register to obtain
information and datasets by:
i. Reading the spatial data access policy and licence files;
ii. Entering personal details;
iii. Reading and agreeing to the licence agreement;
iv. Specifying how they intend to use the data;
v. Receiving a registration confirmation email; and
vi. Obtaining a download notification email, containing a link to the desired file.
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Each time an individual wishes to access particular datasets from Geoscience Australia, they
must complete steps c to f, after which the data may be collected, duplicated and utilised for
the individual’s specific purposes.

Geoscience Australia Registration/Licencing Stages

Please see print copy for Figure 5.3

Source: Geoscience Australia (2006) & OSDM (2006)

Figure 5.3 Geoscience Australia Security Mechanisms
An overall assessment of the security mechanisms clearly illustrates that there is a
greater concentration on the use of written documentation to govern public data, Internet, and
Government portal access. Written security-related documentation can include materials such
as privacy policies, terms and conditions of use statements, copyright agreements, disclaimers
and licence statements. All of these documents set out details and conditions for using a
particular resource. The most applicable document with respect to CI-related public data is
the licence agreement, which is discussed in greater detail in chapter 6.
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Public data security documentation is intended to control the use of the data available
on websites; therefore it is crucial to understand that this analysis does not refer exclusively to
the use and/or licencing of data. That is, there exists a situation where the written documents
can apply to three different contexts:
1. Internet: to protect and govern website use;
2. Government: to maintain the interests of the Government as a data supplying body;
and
3. Data: to outline the nature of public data use.
Regardless of these factors, public data is provided via the Internet through Government
portals, which implies the need for the security-related mechanisms to cover and apply to all
three sectors.
In many instances, the documentation applies to the first two sectors; the manner in
which public data can be used is simply alluded to, analogous to fine print in legal documents
or endnotes in a thesis. With the exclusion of a number of agencies (that is, the Department of
Lands, DCITA, and Geoscience Australia), data supplying bodies do not attempt to directly
promote their security enforcement mechanisms. More importantly, there is concern over the
content of the materials, in terms of whether they legally provide, and to some extent enforce,
adequate protection for the three areas, thus introducing the need for a content analysis to be
performed on the collected security-related documentation.

5.3 Content Analysis of Security-Related Documentation
The content analysis revealed that the prominent concepts within the security-related
documentation include ‘Information’, ‘Data’, ‘Copyright’, ‘Liability’, ‘Licence’, ‘Accuracy’,
‘Access’, ‘Notice’ and ‘Damage’. There is the need to perform an examination of each term
(refer to Table 5.1 for relevant definitions) with respect to public data availability, and an
analysis of the relationship between key clusters, and terms. This assessment will aid in
establishing the validity of the written documentation as an appropriate method of data
protection, and allow for further discussion and improvement of the documents to be
attempted and suggested.
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Table 5.1 Key Concept Definitions
Concept
Information
Data
Copyright
Liability
Licence
Accuracy
Access
Notice

Damage

Definition
General website content, such as a description of the data
supplying agency and details about its operations or
functions
Downloadable files, statistics, images and documents that
can be accessed, stored and potentially modified by an
individual
Protection against unlawful use and duplication of data
and/or information
Who is responsible or accountable for the negative
consequences arising from using information and/or data
Sets out the conditions, permissions and nature of data use
Quality and completeness of information
Right to gather or obtain public information and/or data
Informing the data supplying agency that information
and/or data will be used for a purpose other than that
specified in the documentation, and seeking permission to
engage in such use
Problem or negative consequence arising from information
use

A high level inspection (see Figure 5.4) of the important themes shows clear
clustering between ‘Information’, ‘Liability’, ‘Damage’ and ‘Accuracy’, meaning that the
concepts are related as they co-occur in similar contexts. An interesting note is that concepts
such as ‘Data’ and ‘Licence’ are clearly isolated from other themes, thus indicating that the
linkage between the two concept groups is relatively weak. A weak relationship is an
undesired outcome given that an ideal security-related document should contain close or tight
linkages between such clusters. That is, ‘liability’, ‘damage’ and ‘accuracy’ should be applied
or related to the licencing of public data and vice versa. The two distinct groups are discussed
with reference to why they are dominant within the documentation, and establishing the
context in which they are used. Similarly, the issue of copyright is reflected on due to its
prominence in the documentation. A key question is how effective this technique is in
preventing public data from exploitation.
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Analysis of Security-Related Documentation

Notice

Copyright

Co-occurring
Concepts

Isolated
Concepts

Liability

Damage
Accuracy
Information

Licence
Access

Data

Key

Major
Concepts

Other
Important
Concepts

Figure 5.4 Content Analysis of Security-Related Documentation

5.3.1 The Information-Liability-Damage-Accuracy Cluster
This cluster demonstrates a clear trend in the written documentation, focused on
accountability. The central theme is that the data supplying agencies wish to renounce
responsibility for the negative consequences that may arise from the use of information
contained on their website. Many agencies provide information simply "for the purpose of
disseminating information free of charge for the benefit of the public" (Department of
Environment and Heritage, 2006), but claim no responsibility for damage resulting from its
use. The damage in this instance refers primarily to the accuracy of the information, more so
than its transparency or what it may reveal about Australia's critical infrastructure:
“Energy Australia will not be liable for any indirect or consequential
loss arising out of the use of the website, including loss of profits”
(Energy Australia, 2006).
These sentiments are shared by agencies such as The Australian Gas Light Company
(2006) and Integral Energy (2006), amongst others, in their legal notices and disclaimer
statements.
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While this cluster does not refer specifically to public data use, it is vital to
understand that public data is often confused with information; the line between the two
concepts is exceedingly blurred. A majority of agencies are not conscious that they are
indirect public data providers, and should perhaps revise their content and apply security
measures accordingly. Thus, they simply provide disclaimers and other policies to protect
themselves, but have not clearly considered their responsibility to ensuring that Australia's CI
is not compromised using their publicly available information, which in this case is primarily
details relating to the operations and networks of each respective body.

5.3.2 The Data-Licence Cluster
The Data-Licence cluster refers to the conditions defined by data supplying bodies to
control the manner in which an individual may use data. Throughout the data collection
process, licences of varying degree of detail were identified. The Office of Spatial Data
Management (on behalf of Geoscience Australia) provided one of the most comprehensive
licences, specifying the nature of the licence, access to data and end user notice details. For
example:
“Access to Data: The Licensee must access the Data, including any
current updates to the Data, using a validated email address, or any
other authentication procedure as notified by OSDM from time to
time.
End-user notices: The Licensee must include a notice in the metadata
supplied to End-users with the Data or Derivative Product, to make
End-users aware that the Data was sourced from the Commonwealth
and is used under licence and to disclose the nature of any
modification the Licensee has made to the Data" (Office of Spatial
Data Management, 2006).
The OSDM licence agreement also contains details such as:
-

Retention of notices;

-

Records of distribution;

-

Responsibility for employees and agents;

-

Term; and

-

Termination.
An interesting detail of the licence is that an individual may "use, reproduce, modify,

commercially exploit and communicate the data..." (Office of Spatial Data Management,
2006) in any way once the licence has been granted. This differs from other data supplying
bodies, such as the Sensis that requires written permission for data to be reformatted and

-87-

The Threat of Public Data Availability on Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP), and the Level of
Awareness Amongst Security Experts in Australia

displayed, and the data cannot be used for commercial purposes (Sensis, 2006b). Similarly,
the Department of Lands (2006) requires permission to be granted before any manipulation of
data is carried out.
As was mentioned, the Data-Licence cluster is clearly isolated from the previously
introduced cluster, and licences concerning public data access seem incomplete to an extent.
That is, once the data is accessed there are no obvious procedures in position to restrict users
carrying out unauthorised modifications to the data. This lack of enforcement presents a clear
flaw in the security-related documentation, as individuals can easily disregard the procedures
in place.

5.3.3 Copyright
Copyright was a central theme in the content analysis, with copyright statements
aiming to protect against the illegal use and duplication of data and/or information. Although
a clear linkage was not evident in the content analysis, an ideal situation would see the
copyright statement interweaved with the previous two clusters, relating to information and
data. The information in such statements are intended to define the manner in which
information and/or data can be used, and reveal the consequences of any illegitimate
activities. Most agencies, including the Attorney General's Department (2005), Department of
Defence (2005), NSW Department of Education and Training (2001) and Department of
Transport and Regional Services (2006), succeed in providing these details:
“You may download, display, print and reproduce this material in
unaltered form only (retaining this notice and imagery metadata) for
your personal, non-commercial use or use within your family or
organisation” (Department of Defence, 2005).
As with the previous cluster, the copyright statements appear relatively weak due to the lack
of policing and enforcement. Consequently, disregarding the copyright statements is not
difficult.

5.4 Applying the Content Analysis in a Realistic Setting
It is clear that there are flaws or inconsistencies in the techniques presently used to
govern public data (information) use. An individual is able to obtain public data with relative
ease, and little inconvenience. The most structured and stringent method encountered in this
study (that of Geoscience Australia) possesses many positive features, but there are clearly
missing elements. Despite the intention of the registration process and documentation, little or
close to no contact is made with the individual accessing the data, with no ‘policing’ strategy
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in place to ensure security once the data has been accessed. Public data availability in
Australia is undoubtedly a risk to the CIP process; therefore, the threat of public data
availability can, and should be treated as a risk that must be minimised. This risk requires a
structured strategy or lifecycle to ensure that it is reduced before the public data availability
situation in Australia escalates. A lifecycle is suggested, based on risk mitigation literature,
and the previously presented CIP process.

5.5 The Public Data Protection Lifecycle
This study proposes that the threat of public data availability be categorised in a
similar manner to any risk and be managed by adapting existing risk management procedures,
such as that developed by Standards Australia (2004). Additionally, there is the need to align
the CIP risk assessment process presented in chapter 2 (section 2.3.2) to that of protecting
public data using written documentation. Ideally, the process should be applied to Internetrelated information, and be adopted by all public data suppliers across Australia for it to be
effective, specifically within the Federal and State Government areas, requiring public data
availability to be centrally managed.
A Public Data Protection Lifecycle has been proposed using the outcomes of the data
collection phase and the content analysis. The lifecycle should answer the following
questions:
1. What public data requires protection? Which of the identified data elements are
considered sensitive? How accurate is the data?
2. What are the potential risks? What are the sources of the risk? What threat scenarios
are possible?
3. Who will be granted access to the data? What a user can and cannot do with the data?
Must the user provide notice of any data manipulation that takes place or ask for
permission? What issues are applicable, for example, licencing and copyright issues?
Do any significant dependencies exist between data elements?
4. What is the response if the scenario or breach were to eventuate?
5. Who is responsible for the negative implications that may arise? How will users be
notified of their responsibility; is accountability information going to be stipulated in
the written documentation? How liable are the data supplying agencies?
6. Will the success of the lifecycle be measured? How will the lifecycle be examined in
terms of effectiveness? How often will the lifecycle be reviewed?
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7. Will the process be recorded for future purposes? How will data suppliers be notified
of the changes to the process? What techniques will be used to notify individuals of
changes to the new process?
By articulating these questions, a number of distinct phases for protecting public data
using written documentation can be drawn out. The ensuing process is presented graphically
(Figure 5.5) in a cyclical fashion with each node representing a set of questions from the
proposed Public Data Protection Lifecycle. The phases collectively establish a finer
understanding of what is expected from public data users, through to the consequences of any
breach or misuse of data, forming a lifecycle or iterative loop that can diminish public data
threat to CIP, and encourage that the process assume a more structured form. In particular, it
introduces the concept of policing or follow-up procedures to ensure that the process is
credible and achieve the ultimately desired outcome of protecting public data concerning
Australia’s CI.
Although the lifecycle is targeted in this section at written documentation such as
licence agreements, privacy policies, disclaimers and copyright statements, it provides
flexibility to allow for additional security mechanisms to safeguard public data (and
consequently the CIP process) to be incorporated at a later date. This ultimately results in an
adaptable and layered approach to manage public data availability in Australia, whilst also
solidifying the existing method written documentation, which is currently the most stringent
technique employed. It is valuable at this stage to evaluate the present use of the lifecycle
stages.
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Public Data Protection Lifecycle Stages

1
Establish context of
public data & relative
sensitivity

7

Constantly record
and review the
process

Identify the risks to
the CIP process of
the data being
available

6

Monitor & enforce to
proactively manage
the risk

Evaluate/measure
the risk & define
access, licencing &
security mechanisms
(based on outcomes
of stages 1 & 2)

Determine liability in
the particular
situation

Specify the response
& consequences if
risk eventuates

5

4

2

3

Figure 5.5 Proposed Public Data Protection Lifecycle

5.6 The Current State of the Public Data Protection Lifecycle in
Australia
To reiterate, the underlying account emerging from the content analysis is, that
current written documentation only partially covers the ideal lifecycle phases. Presently, the
Australian data suppliers studied in this research all display weaknesses in the proposed
Public Data Protection Lifecycle. It appears in many instances that the initial decision in
determining what data is made publicly available and what data is too sensitive to be made
available is absent. That is, in the majority of cases there has been no attempt to classify CIrelated data based on sensitivity, and the decision to release certain data to the public has
never been authorised.
Additionally, the latter stages of the cycle are overlooked; there are no enforcement
mechanisms in place to prevent public data from being used in a prohibited manner. Whilst in
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many instances, there is reference to the fact that data cannot be manipulated, or taken out of
its original context and format, there exists the opportunity to do so with data provided in
their native format such as in a spreadsheet with columns and rows. This leaves the data open
to misuse, almost inviting the user to apply the data in other ways, (possibly even sinister),
such as for:
-

Competitive intelligence;

-

Reselling;

-

Fraud;

-

Inferences and data mining; and

-

Organised crime.

More specific to this thesis is the ability to profile critical infrastructure thereby
compromising the CIP process, through any of the abovementioned activities.
To reinforce the inadequacy of existing public data security mechanisms, the
following discussion on data manipulation techniques is presented, illustrating the manner
and ease with which public data can be manipulated with no preventative measures in place.
More specifically, the encountered security techniques can do little to remove the capability
of manipulating/presenting data for one’s own purposes.

5.7 Data Manipulation/Presentation Techniques
Data

manipulation/presentation techniques, in this instance,

refer

to the

transformation of the raw data collected into an alternate form, consequently highlighting the
possible uses of public data concerning Australia’s CI. A key point is that the data is
originally in an unstructured form, whether it is physical and/or electronic in nature.
However, with the use of various tools, varying in complexity and information technology
knowledge required, the data can be shaped into a more valuable asset specific to CI. Thus,
the information can be employed for secondary purposes, ulterior to the purposes originally
intended. This chapter has introduced the available security techniques; none of which can
prohibit public data manipulation. This section aims to demonstrate the existing ability to
alter data from its original form, allowing for scenarios to be established, which reinforces the
threat to CI, and the CIP process.
Manipulation/Presentation techniques refer to any tools or methods that can be
employed to alter the form of public data. The techniques identified are adapted from an
article focused on information analysis tools for counter terrorism, and are intended to be used
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constructively to counteract the terrorist threat. Popp et al., (2004) discuss the importance of
utilising information technology tools in counter-terrorism efforts. The main theme in the
article is that if information was located and shared more readily by intelligence agencies, it
could assist in anticipating potentially detrimental events and allow the agencies to be better
equipped to avoid them. A number of intelligence or information analysis tools and
techniques are described such as categorisation, clustering, database processing, geospatial
information exploitation, information management and filtering, and visualisation.
“Ultimately, such tools will create a seamless environment where
analysts and decision- and policymakers can come together to
collaborate, translate, find, link, evaluate, share, analyse, and act on
the right information faster than ever before…” (Popp et al., 2004, p.
43).
However, the same tools can be applied for alternative and potentially destructive
purposes, for use by terrorists for instance. It is therefore vital to consider the alternative
perspective by taking a ‘counter counter-terrorism’ approach. That is, the same information
analysis techniques can be used for negative purposes, to create inference about CI using
publicly available data. This thesis proposes that the perspective be carefully considered as
the tools and techniques used by intelligence agencies and Governments for national security
purposes, can potentially be imitated by others for harmless, positive but also for destructive
reasons.
To demonstrate this concept in greater detail a ‘data manipulation/presentation’
scenario has been created to illustrate how data may be handled from its physical/raw form
through to a geographic context using geospatial information exploitation. The categories of
this process (displayed in Figure 5.6) have been adapted from Popp et al.’s (2004) counter
terrorism categories. A number of additional techniques have been added to those presented
in the article to ensure that they are more applicable to this analysis. That is, the categories are
intended to depict a logical structure or flow.
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Manipulation/Presentation Technique
Simple

Physical Data

Digitisation

Electronic
Data Management &
Processing

Visualisation

Geospatial Information
Exploitation
Sophisticated

Figure 5.6 The Manipulation/Presentation Process
The process does not necessarily follow a linear flow, but rather the
manipulation/presentation techniques can be used individually (in any order) or in parallel
depending on the type of analysis and the level of sophistication required. The structure or
flow is important to locate where a specific tool lies with respect to its complexity level and
geospatial context. In this instance, the most sophisticated form of analysis is geospatial
information exploitation, where data can be tied to a geographic position using an information
system. The underlying factor in this discussion is that all methods are intended to ensure the
raw data collected in chapter 4 are more significant and applicable to Australia’s CI. The
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techniques are easily achieved, as the tools are readily available in off-the-shelf software.
Each technique is described and discussed in detail with corresponding examples and/or
illustrations.
Each phase of the manipulation process is defined in Table 5.2, including the manner
in which the techniques can be applied to the data collected in the previous chapter. This is
valuable as it depicts the various scenarios that can be formed using publicly available data.

Table 5.2 Manipulation/Presentation Technique Definitions
Technique
Physical data

Digitisation

Definition
Unstructured real-word data that is
tangible, and cannot be extensively
manipulated. However, meaning
can be extracted from the data
(documents, pictures, videos and
statistics)
The process of converting physical
public data to an electronic format

Electronic data
management and
processing

Collecting, storing, displaying,
analysing, categorising, clustering
and managing electronic data

Visualisation

The process of determining
relationships or associations
between data elements, and mining
for hidden patterns

Geospatial information
exploitation

Associating public data to a spatial
context, and performing analysis
using tools such as a GPS system, a
GIS and spreadsheet software

What can be done using
chapter 4 data?
- Using the tangible
points of interest map
can be used to locate,
and create a list of the
most prominent
infrastructure in the area
- Scanning the tangible
points of interest map as
an image
- Entering the list of
critical infrastructure into
a spreadsheet ready for
further analysis and
processing
- Using data of disparate
forms to collate data by
CI type, thereby creating
a repository of CI (refer
to Figures 5.7, 5.8 and
5.9)
- Defining the
interdependencies
between CI types,
visually creating a CI
network highlighting
important dependencies
- Mining the disparate
public data files to create
inference, and reveal
obscure patterns
- Using the longitude and
latitude coordinates
readily available, map
Australia’s CI and layer
related information

For demonstrative purposes, the technique of electronic data management and
processing has been attempted (at a basic level) to illustrate how the public data collected in
chapter 4 can be collated, which immediately establishes added meaning to the data. This
technique is illustrated through the creation of a number of collages (Figure 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9),
which use information from different data supplying agencies to cluster the data by CI type.
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Although this process is simple, there exists the opportunity to assign more meaning to the
data, for instance by utilising visualisation, and geospatial information exploitation
techniques. The techniques can be executed on data of various forms including audio, motion
and images, all of which can potentially be amalgamated into a geographic information
system.

With such tools, there is the opportunity for individuals/groups with negative

intentions to increase the level of detail by manipulating and processing public data from
disparate sources. This reality supports the need to consider, revisit and revise the public data
situation in Australia.
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Critical Infrastructure: Utilities (Electricity, Gas, Water, Sewage)

Please see print copy for Figure 5.7

Figure 5.7 Collage: The Basic Processing of Utilities Data
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Critical Infrastructure: Transport

Please see print copy for Figure 5.8

Figure 5.8 Collage: The Basic Processing of Transport Data
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Critical Infrastructure: Government/Defence

Please see print copy for Figure 5.9

Figure 5.9 Collage: The Processing of Defence Data
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5.8 Conclusion
This chapter has examined the security mechanisms presently used to govern public
data access in Australia. It is apparent from the content analysis that security-related
documentation does not prevent data from being manipulated using various techniques,
including methods as simple as physical data presentation, to the increasingly complex
geospatial information exploitation. This is primarily due to the fact that while documents are
available to specify the manner in which data can be accessed and used, very little is done to
enforce the mechanisms in a real-world setting. An adaptable Public Data Protection
Lifecycle was presented as a means of minimising the threat of public data availability in
Australia, by subscribing to a structured approach commencing with the identification of the
context and sensitivity of the data, through to the enforcement, monitoring and reviewing
stages. This process highlights the areas in which current data supplying agencies are lacking,
and identifies the structure that must be adopted by all bodies to manage the public data
availability situation in the country. The phases of the Public Data Protection Lifecycle
require further consideration for a set of realistic recommendations to be suggested, which
will assist in consolidating the proposed lifecycle. A survey of security experts involved in
CIP research will assist in accomplishing this task; the results of the survey are discussed in
chapter 6.
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Chapter Six
Public Data & The Security Expert Community in Australia

6.1 Introduction
The objective of this chapter is to gauge the attitudes of security experts in Australia
with regards to the public data availability dilemma. The outcomes of chapters 4 and 5 have
provoked the need for addressing the censorship versus open access debate concerning public
data, and to consider in greater detail the individual stages of the proposed Public Data
Protection Lifecycle. A qualitative survey was distributed to a group of individuals considered
experts in CIP-related research within Australia. Due to the vast and unstructured nature of
public data availability, many components and aspects of the protecting public data must be
considered and a multi-faceted security solution must be devised. The solution is based on the
outcomes of the survey, where there is the need to evaluate alternative security mechanisms to
the written documentation, discuss the perceived effectiveness of licence agreements, and
determine a possible restriction process (through the use of a stakeholder matrix). The
solution components must complement and strengthen the Public Data Protection Lifecycle
presented in chapter 5. This chapter will provide realistic and achievable goals targeted
primarily at the Government (at all levels) sector, but can also be applied by other data
supplying agencies.

6.2 Critical Infrastructure Protection Survey
The Critical Infrastructure Protection Survey (see Appendix A) was distributed in
hardcopy, at the National Security Technology Conference (21st September, 2006) and also
subsequently online. The primary objective of this survey was to discuss issues relating to
public data availability in Australia. Of great importance was to determine and gain an
appreciation of the public data availability situation, as perceived by security experts. A key
factor was to provide an outlet for security experts, researchers and interested parties who are
knowledgeable about CIP to communicate their concerns and attitudes, and assist in providing
suggestions to solve the public data availability dilemma. The required solution must offer
equal benefits to the four distinct community member groups or stakeholders, so as to ensure
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that a particular stakeholder is not disadvantaged in terms of public data access. The
Stakeholders include:
1. Australian Government bodies;
2. Operators of critical infrastructure;
3. Educational institutions and research networks; and

4. General public (citizens).

6.2.1 The Profile of Survey Respondents
The qualitative survey yielded 21 security expert responses, almost half of which
came from individuals employed by the Government sector, as shown in Figure 6.1
(displaying basic demographic details, not to be confused with statistical or quantitative
analyses). With respect to the response rate, the survey was primarily focused on qualitative
responses to further support the development of the Public Data Protection Lifecycle. It must
be emphasised that the number of responses received was not a limiting factor to the study.
Additionally, the solution proposed must be customised and adapted to each organisation
before being implemented, which requires extended research into the needs of the diverse
data supplying agencies when being applied.

Survey Respondents
50
45
40

Percentage

35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0

Government

Consulting

Education

Agriculture

Property &
business

Industry Type

Figure 6.1 Industry Types of Survey Respondents
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The collective profile of survey respondents reveals a heavy reliance on the use of
free public data, or a combination of both free and purchased data. An interesting observation
is that not one individual (organisation) depended solely on purchased public data; a majority
of the respondents found that free public data is also beneficial for their purposes (Figure 6.2).

Types of CI-Related Data Used

5%
0%
14%

38%

Free Data
Free & Purchased Data
Don't use Public Data
Purchased Data
Skipped

43%

Figure 6.2 Types of CI-Related Public Data Used by Respondents
In terms of day-to-day uses of critical infrastructure data, over half the respondents
utilise public data to conduct risk assessment/risk management activities. Additional uses
include:
•

Government intelligence purposes;

•

Business intelligence purposes;

•

Service provisioning;

•

Customer Relationship Management (CRM);

•

Navigation;

•

Construction;

•

Supporting response agencies with geospatial information; and

•

Research (tertiary education) purposes.

The security experts rely on a variety of agencies for collecting public data to support such
tasks, most notably the data supplying agencies identified in chapter 4.
The overall profile of the respondents revealed that the group is knowledgeable
concerning public data use, and that the data is beneficial for accomplishing daily tasks. It is
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crucial to determine the perceived benefits and concerns of public data availability in
Australia as professed by the experts, prior to working towards a solution and reaching a
balance between restricting data from the public domain and openly providing access.

6.3 The Benefits and Concerns of Public Data Availability
Security experts reinforce the need for a balance between data accessibility and
restricting access to data. The survey responses generally indicate that the difficulty in this
situation stems from the fact that public data availability can present both positive and
negative consequences, depending on how it is applied.
Security experts felt that the benefits accruing from public data availability include
promoting community trust, allowing immediate responses in time-critical situations, and
assisting in the completion of daily tasks in specific occupations. The use of public data for
such applications is crucial; therefore, the security experts generally maintained that it would
be unwise to restrict access to the relevant datasets in such situations. The major benefits are
further discussed.

6.3.1 Fostering an Informed and Open Society Based on Trust
A number of security experts felt that community members have a basic right to
access information concerning their surroundings and community. According to a respondent
in the Government sector, encouraging the concealment of basic community data and
enacting harsh restrictions will inevitably result in Australia becoming a “secretive, scared
society”, which is a disagreeable effect. An additional point raised was that CI-related data
should be publicly accessible “to ensure that governments and infrastructure providers are not
relying on security through obscurity.” Trust is an imperative factor in this situation,
particularly in view of sustaining a positive relationship and level of transparency between the
Australian Government and citizens.

6.3.2 Facilitating Timely Responses and Data Exchange
Certain applications, such as emergency management, rely on the transfer and
exchange of CI-related data in a timely fashion. A common notion expressed in the survey is
that in such applications, direct data access is essential. Public data can therefore aid with
activities including continuity planning, evacuation, infrastructure protection, and emergency
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management for incidents, such as earthquakes, cyclones, tsunamis, bushfires, infrastructure
disruptions, and terrorist attacks.

6.3.3 Assisting in Performing Daily Tasks
The survey revealed that the majority of respondents rely on public data in their
respective industries to accomplish daily tasks. Public data access is beneficial in these
situations, and increases safety in particular occupations. For instance, a security expert in the
construction industry maintained, “as a structural engineer, information such as ground levels,
location of buildings, location of electricity, water, gas, etc is critical to the safe design of
buildings and infrastructure.” Therefore, access to relevant CI-data, regardless of sensitivity is
required.
Despite these positive aspects, the situation is complicated due to the potentially
devastating implications of public data availability, which encourages that the issue of data
restriction be considered in order to minimise the existing threats. The concerns relating to
public data availability include impacting on national security efforts (and therefore CIP),
facilitating other forms of misuse, and affecting the privacy and confidentiality of individuals.
These concerns are further explained.

6.3.4 Hindering Infrastructure and National Security Campaigns
The major concern identified regarding public data availability was the potentially
damaging effects on national security and CIP programs, more specifically the use of public
data for aiding in terrorist-related activities. As a survey respondent noted “access to data
should be well-controlled to minimise the possibility of use by foreign and domestic
adversaries”. This thought is shared by other experts, one of which claims “if potential
terrorists can access good quality data over the Internet, this can eliminate the need for on-site
reconnaissance, which in turn eliminates the opportunity for the behaviour to be noticed,
investigated, and attacks disrupted.” Disregarding this concern can result in widespread and
immeasurable physical and psychological consequences.

6.3.5 Facilitating Other Forms of Misuse
The concerns associated with public data availability are not limited to terroristrelated activities. Security experts expressed that CI-related public data can aid other forms of
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misuse and offences, with consequences such as increased crime, services disruption,
vandalism, identity theft/fraud and obtrusive telemarketing.

6.3.6 Compromising Privacy and Confidentiality
Privacy and confidentiality are key concerns in this discussion. While the data of
interest to the research is CI-related, a number of respondents felt that personal privacy is an
additional concern, which also introduces the personal safety dimension to the study.
Therefore, public data availability presents positive and negative implications,
although a Government official responded that open access to data results in “CONCERNS
ONLY”. Similarly, a respondent in the education industry claimed that there were “no major
benefits”, as the positive aspects of public data availability are somewhat overshadowed by
the potentially devastating damage. However, the majority of respondents feel that strict
censorship and data restriction is not a viable option. A common thread in the survey is that
information should be available on a “need-to-know basis”, to the appropriate personnel who
require the data for carrying out tasks that are advantageous in some way. That is, “the
TRADE-OFF between what one needs to have to do their work well, and what needs to be
kept sensitive because it may be used against a nation” must be managed. This is based on the
concept that data should not be made available for individuals with no “legitimate” purpose to
access it. Legitimate in this instance refers to whether an individual can justify that the data
accessed will be used positively. A possible solution to this dilemma is recommended, as is an
attempt to find an appropriate and realistic balance.

6.4 Achieving the Balance: the Public Data Availability Solution
A notable outcome of the survey is that data should only be accessed for “legitimate”
reasons. While in theory, this argument is seemingly valid and rational, in practice it is
difficult to accomplish. For instance, a number of important questions emerge that require
further thought, and answering:
1. What CI-related data elements will be available to certain individuals?
2. What conditions define a “legitimate” purpose?
3. How will the process as a whole be enforced?
A practical solution must be put forward, providing practical answers to these questions.
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The first question may be addressed through the use of a stakeholder matrix
(introduced in section 6.4.1), where a sensitivity based grading system can be employed to
determine the data elements that should be available to certain stakeholders.
In terms of setting out the conditions to define what constitutes a “legitimate”
purpose, public data protection attempts become more difficult, as the notion of legitimacy
can be subject to interpretation. That is, it is difficult for individuals to justify positive uses of
data. A possible approach in situations where sensitive information is required involves the
data supplier assuming customised approach to granting access, whereby access to certain
datasets must be granted on a personal basis after careful consideration.
Finally, the issue of enforcing or policing public data access is difficult, and as the
previous chapter indicated, is often ignored (with respect to written documentation). The
responsibility of enforcing public data access would lie with the data supplying body, but also
with the individual who was granted access to the data. Regular checks are required to control
this situation, and further research into policing public data access is essential.
Addressing these questions evidently requires the development of a multi-faceted
approach focused on the proposed Public Data Protection Lifecycle. This solution is
composed of a number of core elements that can be interweaved, and act in a complementary
capacity to the lifecycle. The components include:
1. Stakeholder matrix for determining the sensitivity of CI data elements;
2. The improvement of non-technical security mechanisms; and

3. The introduction of technical security tools where appropriate, in order to compliment
and support the abovementioned components.

6.4.1 The Stakeholder Matrix
The Stakeholder matrix provides a sensitivity-based grading system that determines
the relative sensitivity of CI data elements, and recommends who should be granted access to
that particular element. The underlying concept behind the stakeholder matrix is to clearly
outline the three grades that can be assigned to a data element:
1. Unclassified/public: a data element that can be accessed by any individual;
2. Restricted: a data element that can be accessed by a specific user group or
stakeholder; and
3. Classified/private: a data element that cannot be publicly accessed.
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The recommendation with respect to this matrix is that it be used by data supplying
agencies and bodies to decide which data elements may require censorship or restricted
access. A sample matrix, based on the findings of the survey, is provided in Figure 6.3. The
diagram depicts a possible classification system to be used as the foundation of the proposed
public data availability solution, addressing the first stage of the lifecycle, which is to
‘Establish context of public data and relative sensitivity’. In its present form, the matrix can
be used as a guideline; however, it is suggested that an expanded matrix be devised
containing a comprehensive list of CI-related data elements and a similar analysis be
performed. The grade assigned to each specific data element is based on whether security
experts felt that the particular element should be available to the respective stakeholder. For
example:
•

If more than 66 percent of security experts felt a data element should be
available, an ‘unclassified’ grade is assigned;

•

If between 33 to 66 percent of security experts believe a data element should be
available, a ‘restricted’ grade is assigned; and

•

If less than 33 percent of security experts believe it should be available, a
‘classified/private’ grade is assigned.
Australian
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Figure 6.3 Data Sensitivity Stakeholder Matrix
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The Stakeholder Matrix is a fundamental concept that will form the basis or
foundation of any public data protection campaign, and is currently a missing element from
the censorship versus open access debate. It is important that the matrix be supported by
additional security mechanisms, both non-technical and technical in nature.

6.4.2 Non-Technical Security Mechanisms
Non-technical security mechanisms refer to public data protection tools that do not
require the use of technology to be accomplished. Defining non-technical security techniques
covers a fragment of the third stage of the Public Data Protection Lifecycle.
Survey respondents feel that non-technical security techniques can be beneficial in
public data protection initiatives, the most appropriate being:
•

Legal and licence agreement containing conditions of use, defining the owner of
the data elements and “WHO” will enforce the agreement

•

Legislations, regulations and penalties, such as fines for breach of legislation or
for inappropriate use

•

Unambiguous policies and guidelines, accessible by the public

•

Developing a register of approved users, and defining how they may use data. A
suggestion was the use of “access control matrices”, auditing and classification

•

Communicating frequently with users about their rights and responsibilities with
respect to data use. Educating users is particularly important; “Educate staff in
government agencies about how data can be used, and what tabs governments are
keeping. E.g. internal audit systems that run on intrusion detection systems might
keep logs of all transactions to do with spatial and statistical data”

•

Limiting sharing between departments and agencies, particularly within the
Government sector, as it is not possible to distribute data and be sure that the data
will be used appropriately

•

Introducing physical security on assets to ensure correct storage, and prevent
illegitimate physical access of data

•

Encouraging a coordinated ‘whole-of-Government’ approach to data protection

•

Prohibiting companies from selling data, which is an extreme option and is not
realistic given the nature of the commercial data sector

•

Using “common sense”

-109-

The Threat of Public Data Availability on Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP), and the Level of
Awareness Amongst Security Experts in Australia

Written documentation in the form of licence agreements is a key non-technical
measure. Chapter 5 demonstrated the flaws in written documentation; the most stringent form
of written documentation was the licence agreement. However, the agreement was flawed in
terms of its contents, but particularly with respect to the lack of enforcement procedures.
When asked whether licence agreements have a part to play in public in the distribution and
use of critical infrastructure data, a majority of security experts responded that licence
agreements, if properly executed, could be definitely beneficial (refer to Figure 6.4). Security
experts generally felt that licence agreements are the initial point of contact with users, and
that without them “there are no boundaries, and unfortunately no one can be trusted.”
However, it was argued that licences should ideally be provided by sector, and some form of
policing strategy must be introduced which is difficult given that free data is becoming
increasingly detailed.
Do Licence Agreements Have a Part to Play?

16

Respondents

14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

Yes

No

Maybe

Figure 6.4 Do Licence Agreements Have a Part to Play?
As maintained by the security experts, licence agreements should ideally contain
information relating to:
•

Laws and legal information detailing and governing use an disclosure of data

•

Conditions of use, including clear definition of restrictions, distribution
limitations, responsibility and accountability information, consequences of
unauthorised release and misuse

•

Statement/advice of other parties who have access to the data

•

Storage requirements, commercial aspects such as payment details

•

Correct acknowledgement of source, vintage and “fixed term so as to ensure
reviews are conducted regularly”
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•

Accompanied by privacy and confidentiality policies, and disclaimers

•

Consideration of the sensitivity of data, as “there should be a rigorous and open
process for classifying sensitive data”

•

Providing a distinction between stakeholder groups, for instance “educational
institutions and citizens need to show legitimate claim to why they need CI data”.
Also, a strict code of conduct for Government agencies regarding licencing is
required, for instance “that the data can only be used by a given person for a
given project and that each requires a certain level of clearance depending on the
context”

Despite these considerations, licence agreements cannot be too strict that they
prohibit people from conducting their work. A number of respondents believe that what
currently exists in licence agreements should be retained, whilst others believe it is difficult to
generalise licence agreements and that the existing agreements must be revised. As pointed
out by a number of respondents, defining an enforceable strategy is crucial to the success of
licence agreements. This reinforces the findings and suggestions of chapter 5; “the point is
WHO will police the licencing?” Therefore, it is apparent that licence agreements have a part
to play in public data protection; however, they must be reinforced by additional mechanisms
such as technology-based techniques as they are limited in their present state.

6.4.3 Technical Security Mechanisms
Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) facilitate access to public data
through the Internet, and consequently are at the centre of the public data availability
dilemma. However, there is the potential to supplement the above-mentioned security
techniques with technical measures in certain situations, and use ICT to assist in protecting
and restricting access to sensitive datasets. This component assists in addressing stage three of
the Public Data Protection Lifecycle.
According to the surveyed security experts, technical security mechanisms may
include:
•

Secure networks not displayed to the public on networks and the Internet,
containing regular and real time encryption, logging, auditing, standard protection
from damage (firewalls, intrusion detection systems) and appropriate filters

•

Access control, and password protection, requiring identity checks to be
performed for more sensitive data, such as defence information
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•

Security clearance for access to sensitive data, including providing proof of
identity and justification in terms of data use

•

“Deliberately non-integrated systems”

•

“Central storage and distributed access”

•

Review and update of security techniques, and measuring their effectiveness

Such techniques, as with the non-technical measures, must be enforced and managed
adequately, and must be intertwined with the Public Data Protection Lifecycle which
encompasses the Stakeholder Matrix.

6.5 Discussion
The proposed solution (Figure 6.5) demonstrated two components of the Public Data
Protection Lifecycle in detail. However, it is apparent that additional research must be
conducted into the remaining lifecycle stages, in particular stage six that involves monitoring
and enforcing the data protection mechanisms in place. The stages of the lifecycle will vary
depending on the department, the type of data elements available and the stakeholders.
Therefore, a standard lifecycle cannot be presented. It is recommended that the stages of the
lifecycle be adhered to, but that the specific details contained within each stage are tailored to
each department.
A key outcome of survey is that the situation may be interpreted in many ways, and
one solution alone (for example, a technical solution) cannot be employed. Rather, there is the
need for a responsive solution that targets specific stakeholders, and is concerned with the
sensitivity of public data in terms of compromising the CIP process, and protecting individual
CI elements. However, despite the multi-phased solution provided by the Public Data
Protection Lifecycle, it is important to note that the approach is not infallible.
An important point raised by a respondent that must be discussed at this stage is that
perhaps the public data availability dilemma is being approached from an incorrect angle, that
we should not address the issue only in terms of the mechanisms that can be implemented.
Rather, it may be “about facing the root problems of terrorism, and addressing them.”
Extending this point beyond the terrorist threat, it may be valuable to address other adverse
issues such as vandalism, fraud and competitive intelligence, and engage in why such
activities take place and attempt to limit this. This requires further study, and is beyond the
scope of this study.
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Proposed Solution

1
Establish context of
public data & relative
sensitivity

Australian
Government
Bodies

Operators of
CI

Education
Institutions &
Research
Networks

General Public

Major Defence Sites

100

58

32

16

Telecom Exchanges

100

89

50

17

Sewage Outfalls

100

95

68

53

Banks (Financial Hubs)

89

74

47

32

Schools

100

79

84

79

Cultural Icons

84

53

74

74

Gas Pipelines

100

79

42

32

Shopping Malls

84

89

68

84

Dams

100

79

47

37

Hospitals

100

84

63

74

Places of Worship

83

67

67

89

Electricity Grids

94

83

58

17

Key:

7

Constantly record
and review the
process

Identify the risks to
the CIP process of
the data being
available

6

Monitor & enforce to
proactively manage
the risk

Evaluate/measure
the risk & define
access, licencing &
security mechanisms
(based on outcomes
of stages 1 & 2)

Determine liability in
the particular
situation

Specify the response
& consequences if
risk eventuates

5

4

Classified

Restricted

Unclassified

2

3

Non-technical security
mechanisms

Technical security
mechanisms

Figure 6.5 Detailed Solution Based on the Public Data Protection Lifecycle
When considering the proposed lifecycle in terms of critical infrastructure protection
it is important to note that it is one aspect of a broader solution. As stated by a security expert,
“a government cannot hope to achieve a comprehensive approach to critical infrastructure
protection if they are giving away data about their own infrastructure. It does not make it
difficult for terrorists to obtain the data… As terrorists become more aware of not only spatial
data availability, and ways to use this data in well-defined processes, many problems will
arise.” Providing a wealth of CI-related data online can result in unscrupulous individuals
conducting their own risk assessments, defining areas where the greatest losses will occur,
and easily identifying the location of the CI elements. However, censorship is not the answer.
As demonstrated in this chapter, a balance is crucial and many elements such as employing a
structured approach, and determining the root cause of detrimental activities that can be
carried out using public data, is essential.

6.6 Conclusion
This chapter has presented the findings of the survey of security experts involved in
CIP research in Australia. The public data availability situation was discussed in terms of the
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concerns and benefits, and the need for a balance between censorship and open data access
was reinforced. The outcomes of the survey resulted in the development of a sensitivity based
Stakeholder matrix for classifying public data, and a definition of the appropriate nontechnical and technical security techniques that can be utilised. The three components may
easily be interweaved into the proposed Public Data Protection Lifecycle, demonstrating the
adaptability of this structured solution. While the lifecycle provides more structure to the
process, it is apparent that it cannot solely prohibit the misuse of public data for comprising
the CIP process. However, it does indicate that the current techniques for protecting public
data must be revised. Chapter 7 will stipulate in greater detail the specific outcomes of this
research, and provide future direction for study, and to the data supplying agencies.
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Chapter Seven
Conclusion

7.1 Research Summary
The purpose of this study was to determine and understand the threat or risk of public
data availability on Australia’s critical infrastructure (CI), and the critical infrastructure
protection (CIP) process. A review of CI, CIP and public data availability literature was
conducted, which revealed the need for an Australian-based study on public data availability.
The importance of examining the balance between data censorship and data access in the
interest of national security was a prominent issue. Based on the literature review outcomes, it
was evident that this research required that data suppliers be defined and located, that CI data
be collected from the supplying agencies and that the security mechanisms encountered be
evaluated to verify whether public data availability was indeed a threat in Australia. By
focussing on the awareness levels and opinions of security experts in Australia, a
collaborative approach to establishing a solution to the data censorship versus open access
debate was possible.
The research results include the development of a comprehensive, sector-based
review of Australia’s data supplying agencies and a critical infrastructure repository of
publicly available CI data (refer to ‘CI Data Repository’ CD). A structured approach to
protecting public data from potential misuse was offered through the Public Data Protection
Lifecycle, and various stages of the lifecycle were strengthened through the outcomes of the
qualitative survey of security experts. The significant findings of the research are discussed.

7.2 Significant Findings
This research has resulted in a number of clear outcomes relating to the nature of the
public data availability situation in Australia. The significant findings are discussed,
identifying the aims and objectives satisfied by each outcome. The specific aims of this
project are:
1. To identify the data supplying agencies across Australia;
2. To collect public data from the identified agencies;
3. To gather and record details on the security mechanisms encountered in the data
collection process;
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4. To perform a content analysis on any written security-related documents;
5. To display the possible methods of data manipulation; and

6. To assess the level of awareness, and opinions of security experts.

7.2.1 Outcome 1: A Data Repository of Australia’s CI
This outcome addressed objectives 1 and 2 of the study. The specific result was that it
is possible to simply engage in the creation of a comprehensive, sector-based repository of
Australia’s CI. The Australian Government, through related Federal and State departments,
offers a wealth of free data for public access. Other data supplying agencies are also present,
such as commercial agencies and utility companies, who provide data both for profit and
indirectly. The public data collected from disparate sources, and in multiple formats can be
incorporated into the repository, and be stored for any purpose.
The data repository created, which was not exhaustive, demonstrated that revealing
information can be extracted concerning Australia’s CI. While for research and emergency
management purposes this is important, a number of negative implications introduce the
question of whether the positive uses of public data are overshadowed in certain situations.
The potentially damaging effects of public data availability revolve around simplifying the
ability to collect information that can compromise Australia’s CI, and therefore the CIP
process. Such activities include terrorism, fraud, identity theft, vandalism, and competitive
intelligence.

7.2.2 Outcome 2: ‘Sensitive but Unclassified’ Data Exists in Australia
Outcome 2 fulfils objective 5 of the research. The ability to manipulate/present data
in a form different from its original has demonstrated that ‘sensitive but unclassified’ data is
in abundance in Australia. Data elements independently appear harmless, but techniques
ranging in complexity and sophistication, such as geospatial information exploitation allow
for inferences to be made, and patterns to be extracted concerning Australia’s CI, thus posing
a threat to the CIP process. An important note is that sensitive but unclassified data can be
manipulated or modified easily, and existing security mechanisms (primarily written
documentation) cannot prevent such activities. An additional aspect of this outcome is the
importance of the spatial context and mapping of CI. The importance of geography and the
spatial context was alluded to through this research, and is an area for further study. This
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claim is based on the argument that anything can be tied to a geographic location, and entered
into a geographic information system (GIS).

7.2.3 Outcome 3: Current Written Security Mechanisms (Documentation)
Should be Revised
This outcome satisfies objectives 3 and 4 of the research. Present written
documentation aimed at governing the use of public data, Internet and Government resources
are inadequate, as they prevent data misuse, are generally disregarded, and have no evident
consequences. A contributing factor to their shortfall is that enforcement of such documents
does not exist. Additionally, the contents of the documents must be strengthened, to follow
the Office of Spatial Data Management model. This model is a superior indicator of how
licencing of public data should work; however, there is the added need to extend this model
into an enforced licencing scheme, which will form one component of public data protection.
A key consideration is that written documentation cannot independently offer protection
against public data misuse.

7.2.4 Outcome 4: The Importance of a Collaborative Approach to Public
Data Protection
This outcome is related to objectives 4 and 5, but specifically satisfies objective 6. It
is clear that the security expert community is knowledgeable about the public data availability
dilemma. That is, many of the surveyed individuals subscribe to the view that providing open
access to data can be detrimental to Australia’s CI, but that restriction or censorship alone is
not an appropriate solution. Survey respondents expressed the notion of a ‘balance’, and a
collaborative solution was presented based on:
1. Risk management literature, resulting in the development of a Public Data Protection
Lifecycle which provides a structure, multi-phased approach to safeguarding public
data from misuse; and
2.

Security expert survey responses, resulting in the development of a sensitivity-based
matrix, which aims at providing a way of classifying public data and restricting
access of certain datasets to specific stakeholders. Additionally, survey responses
reinforce various lifecycle phases, suggesting improvements to licence agreements
(the most stringent form of existing security mechanism), and introducing technical

-117-

The Threat of Public Data Availability on Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP), and the Level of
Awareness Amongst Security Experts in Australia

and non-technical security mechanisms to be incorporated into the lifecycle, such as
password-based access and enforcement of licence agreements and legal documents.

7.3 Links to Earlier Findings
This study was initially inspired by Breeding (2003), who conducted a similar
assessment on America’s critical services. The outcomes of Breeding’s research indicated that
openly available information concerning America’s critical infrastructure could prove
damaging, in that they allow inferences to be made, which could consequently compromise
any protection efforts by providing valuable details relating to the weak points and
interdependencies between infrastructure items. It was therefore important to shift the study to
an Australian setting, and evaluate the national threat, suggest possible areas for
improvement, and work towards a solution that could be practically implemented by data
supplying bodies.

The general outcomes of this study were aligned with Breeding’s, highlighting the
potentially negative consequences enabled, and to an extent facilitated by the provision of
public data relating to Australia’s CI. An additional element of surveying security experts
added value to the study in terms of allowing an initial collaborative approach to reaching a
balance between restriction and open access to be employed. The outcomes of this research
are particularly relevant to the Government sector, specifically in an era where the eGovernment movement is gaining traction and popularity in Australian, resulting in a wealth
of data being published online to encourage openness between the Government and its
people.

7.4 Research Contribution
The contribution of this research has been to the fields of CIP and public data
availability, and the study is particularly applicable to data supplying agencies in Australia.
The research has gained recognition and interest from various Australian agencies such as the
Department of Defence, the Department of Transport and Regional Services and the
Australian Institute of Criminology, in addition to a number of research institutions. This is
based on the fact that the research has defined the threat of public data availability, and the
important steps and possible approaches of minimising the risk associated with open access.
The recommendations offered are practical, and can be applied to and adapted by any data
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supplier. The chief contribution is the multi-phased Public Data Protection Lifecycle, which
can be developed into a structured approach adopted across the entire data supplier sector.

7.5 Recommendations and Further Research
This research has presented areas for further study, in addition to the need for action
to be taken based on the identified outcomes and conclusions. The study was centred on
providing a complete and comprehensive view of the public data availability situation in
Australia; the research was not exhaustive in certain areas. Thus the research can be extended
in a number of ways, as complimentary areas for study have emerged. This research can be
extended in its present form in Australia, and may also be replicated in its entirety
internationally using the devised methodology. The opportunity for further study exists in a
number of fields.
The need for an exhaustive sector-based public data availability study is a primary
area for further research, particularly within the Government sector to assess the CI-related
public data available, and classify the data accordingly. This is related to revisiting the issue
of censorship and restriction; the attempt to find a balance was introduced using the
sensitivity-based matrix, however, this matrix can be refined and extended across the
identified data supplier sectors.
Similarly, the Public Data Protection Lifecycle was provided as the foundation of a
structured approached for safeguarding publicly available data in an attempt to prevent
misuse. The lifecycle phases were not expressed in terms of the specific details and substages. Research into the lifecycle, and a structured approach is required, as is a strategy that
can be tested in multiple sectors and can be adapted to the needs of the diverse data supplying
agencies. Each stage of the lifecycle can be built upon and revised in future studies.
As was alluded to throughout this research, the spatial context is significant with
respect to CI and CIP. With the prominence of mapping tools and Geographic Information
Systems for CIP-related activities, spatial studies relating specifically to public data
availability are important areas. Viewing the public data availability situation from a spatial
context involves all public data elements collected to be associated to a geographic location,
and provides a sophisticated method of displaying and manipulating public data.
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Finally, this research has highlighted the need for improvements to the CIP process.
This would involve incorporating public data availability as a threat to CIP efforts,
recognising the need for mitigation strategies and establishing and enforcing the strategies.
This is closely tied to studies concerning the Public Data Protection Lifecycle, and evaluating
the structured approach to managing the public data availability situation.
Any combination of the above areas provides an alternative viewpoint of CIP, and
would aid greatly in a practical setting, particularly by assisting data supplying agencies to
manage the public data they possess in an effective manner.

7.6 Conclusion
Breeding (2003) recognised that public data availability posed a threat to the CIP
process in America, as data elements regardless of sensitivity were available for general
access and use. A review of literature in topics such as censorship introduced added
complexity to the situation. That is, a majority of public data is available and distributed using
the Internet, and the inherent nature of the Internet makes it difficult for censorship to be
enforced. Additionally, the concept of censorship implies mistrust and is restrictive, which is
undesired given that public data is required in certain situations. The need for a balance
between the two streams became apparent, resulting in an attempt to move towards this
balance by conducting research into the existing public data availability situation in Australia,
and determining the most appropriate approach for managing the situation.
A structured approach to managing the vast amounts of CI-related public data is
critical, as is the need for the adoption of this approach by all data supplying agencies
countrywide. This method provides a sensitivity-based classification system, in order to grade
CI public data elements, and provides a form of balance between censorship and open
information access. The positive aspects of the presented lifecycle include its adaptability,
flexibility, and applicability to data suppliers in disparate sectors. The lifecycle incorporates
technical and non-technical security mechanisms, and introduces enforcement, documentation
and review as important enablers of its success. Unless public data availability is considered a
possible impediment to CIP efforts, and a structured approach of this nature is adopted, then
Australia’s CI is at risk due to the availability of revealing data elements that allow for weak
points to be determined. Data can be manipulated and misused to instigate harm to Australia’s
CI, which will be difficult to recover from with potentially physical and psychological effects,
as has been historically evident.
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Appendix A. Survey

Critical Infrastructure Protection Survey

Critical infrastructure are the essential services that contribute to the stability
and security of a country, and include energy, banking and finance, transport
and distribution, utilities, health, the food supply and communications. This
survey explores the benefits and costs of public data availability on critical
infrastructure in Australia. The results will be used to inform Government
policy with respect to public data.
This survey is voluntary, and has received ethics clearance from the
University of Wollongong. Filling out the survey should take approximately 10
minutes to complete. We value your feedback.
If you have further questions or would like a copy of the completed thesis,
please contact

on

(Faculty of Informatics, University Of Wollongong).
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1. Please select your industry type

□
□
□

□
□
□

Government
Education
Property & Business

Consulting
Agriculture
Other (please specify) _____________

2. Which data sources have you heard of? (please select all that apply)

□
□
□
□
□
□
□

All of the following
GeoScience Australia
G-NAF
PSMA
Salmat
Dun and Bradstreet
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS)

□ Attorney General's Office
□ MapData Sciences
□ Sensis
□ Utility companies
□ TISN
□ MapInfo
□ AND/OR/Other (specify) _____________

3. Does your organisation use critical infrastructure related data?

□

Yes, Free Data

□

Yes, Commercial Data

□

Both

□

No

4. If you use critical infrastructure data for day-to-day activities, what do you
use it for?

□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□

For government intelligence purposes
For business intelligence purposes
To conduct risk assessment/risk management
For service provisioning
For telemarketing
For Customer Relationship Management (CRM)
For navigation
Other (please specify) __________________________________________________

5. A Licence Agreement is a written document that sets out the conditions for
using a particular resource (such as public data). Do you believe licence
agreements have a part to play in the distribution and use of critical
infrastructure data?
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6. What do you believe should be included in Critical Infrastructure-related
license agreements?

7. The following matrix provides a list of publicly available data elements. For
each stakeholder, indicate which data elements should be made available by
checking the boxes.

CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE
Major Defence Sites
Telecom Exchanges
Sewage Outfalls
Banks (Financial
Hubs)
Schools
Cultural Icons
Gas Pipelines
Shopping Malls
Dams
Hospitals
Places of Worship
Electricity Grids

Australian
Government
Bodies
(Federal & State)

STAKEHOLDER
Operators of
Educational
Critical
Institutions &
Infrastructure
Research Networks

General
Public
(Citizens)

□
□
□
□

□
□
□
□

□
□
□
□

□
□
□
□

□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□

□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□

□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□

□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□

8. What INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY and NON-TECHNICAL measures do you
think may assist in protecting public data from potential misuse in Australia?
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9. Do you believe anyone should be able to purchase critical infrastructure
datasets? Why/why not?

10. What do you feel are the major concerns and/or benefits related to public
data availability?
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